The problem of moral responsibility is intimately connected with the problem of free will.
If our actions are causally determined by prior events, including a chain of events that goes back before we were born, libertarians do not see how we can feel responsible for them.
If our actions are directly caused by chance, they are simply random and determinists do not see how we can feel responsibility for them.
But we do feel responsible.
Despite more than twenty-three centuries of philosophizing, most modern thinkers have not moved significantly beyond this core problem of randomness and free will - the mistaken idea that free actions are caused directly by a random event.
To be responsible for our actions, they must have been caused by something within us, they must "depend on us" (the Greeks called this ἐφ ἡμῖν). Modern "agent-causal" theorists demand that something in the agent's mind - perhaps a uniquely mental substance - gives us the power to cause our actions.
In our Cogito model, responsibility comes from an adequately determined will choosing from among randomly generated alternative possibilities.
We have identified a number of critical requirements for our Cogito model of free will. Some of these are requirements for freedom. Others are requirements for an adequately determined will.