Philosophers
Mortimer Adler Rogers Albritton Alexander of Aphrodisias Samuel Alexander William Alston Anaximander G.E.M.Anscombe Anselm Louise Antony Thomas Aquinas Aristotle David Armstrong Harald Atmanspacher Robert Audi Augustine J.L.Austin A.J.Ayer Alexander Bain Mark Balaguer Jeffrey Barrett William Barrett William Belsham Henri Bergson George Berkeley Isaiah Berlin Richard J. Bernstein Bernard Berofsky Robert Bishop Max Black Susanne Bobzien Emil du Bois-Reymond Hilary Bok Laurence BonJour George Boole Émile Boutroux Daniel Boyd F.H.Bradley C.D.Broad Michael Burke Lawrence Cahoone C.A.Campbell Joseph Keim Campbell Rudolf Carnap Carneades Nancy Cartwright Gregg Caruso Ernst Cassirer David Chalmers Roderick Chisholm Chrysippus Cicero Tom Clark Randolph Clarke Samuel Clarke Anthony Collins Antonella Corradini Diodorus Cronus Jonathan Dancy Donald Davidson Mario De Caro Democritus Daniel Dennett Jacques Derrida René Descartes Richard Double Fred Dretske John Dupré John Earman Laura Waddell Ekstrom Epictetus Epicurus Austin Farrer Herbert Feigl Arthur Fine John Martin Fischer Frederic Fitch Owen Flanagan Luciano Floridi Philippa Foot Alfred Fouilleé Harry Frankfurt Richard L. Franklin Bas van Fraassen Michael Frede Gottlob Frege Peter Geach Edmund Gettier Carl Ginet Alvin Goldman Gorgias Nicholas St. John Green H.Paul Grice Ian Hacking Ishtiyaque Haji Stuart Hampshire W.F.R.Hardie Sam Harris William Hasker R.M.Hare Georg W.F. Hegel Martin Heidegger Heraclitus R.E.Hobart Thomas Hobbes David Hodgson Shadsworth Hodgson Baron d'Holbach Ted Honderich Pamela Huby David Hume Ferenc Huoranszki Frank Jackson William James Lord Kames Robert Kane Immanuel Kant Tomis Kapitan Walter Kaufmann Jaegwon Kim William King Hilary Kornblith Christine Korsgaard Saul Kripke Thomas Kuhn Andrea Lavazza Christoph Lehner Keith Lehrer Gottfried Leibniz Jules Lequyer Leucippus Michael Levin Joseph Levine George Henry Lewes C.I.Lewis David Lewis Peter Lipton C. Lloyd Morgan John Locke Michael Lockwood Arthur O. Lovejoy E. Jonathan Lowe John R. Lucas Lucretius Alasdair MacIntyre Ruth Barcan Marcus Tim Maudlin James Martineau Nicholas Maxwell Storrs McCall Hugh McCann Colin McGinn Michael McKenna Brian McLaughlin John McTaggart Paul E. Meehl Uwe Meixner Alfred Mele Trenton Merricks John Stuart Mill Dickinson Miller G.E.Moore Thomas Nagel Otto Neurath Friedrich Nietzsche John Norton P.H.Nowell-Smith Robert Nozick William of Ockham Timothy O'Connor Parmenides David F. Pears Charles Sanders Peirce Derk Pereboom Steven Pinker Plato Karl Popper Porphyry Huw Price H.A.Prichard Protagoras Hilary Putnam Willard van Orman Quine Frank Ramsey Ayn Rand Michael Rea Thomas Reid Charles Renouvier Nicholas Rescher C.W.Rietdijk Richard Rorty Josiah Royce Bertrand Russell Paul Russell Gilbert Ryle Jean-Paul Sartre Kenneth Sayre T.M.Scanlon Moritz Schlick Arthur Schopenhauer John Searle Wilfrid Sellars Alan Sidelle Ted Sider Henry Sidgwick Walter Sinnott-Armstrong J.J.C.Smart Saul Smilansky Michael Smith Baruch Spinoza L. Susan Stebbing Isabelle Stengers George F. Stout Galen Strawson Peter Strawson Eleonore Stump Francisco Suárez Richard Taylor Kevin Timpe Mark Twain Peter Unger Peter van Inwagen Manuel Vargas John Venn Kadri Vihvelin Voltaire G.H. von Wright David Foster Wallace R. Jay Wallace W.G.Ward Ted Warfield Roy Weatherford C.F. von Weizsäcker William Whewell Alfred North Whitehead David Widerker David Wiggins Bernard Williams Timothy Williamson Ludwig Wittgenstein Susan Wolf Scientists David Albert Michael Arbib Walter Baade Bernard Baars Jeffrey Bada Leslie Ballentine Marcello Barbieri Gregory Bateson Horace Barlow John S. Bell Mara Beller Charles Bennett Ludwig von Bertalanffy Susan Blackmore Margaret Boden David Bohm Niels Bohr Ludwig Boltzmann Emile Borel Max Born Satyendra Nath Bose Walther Bothe Jean Bricmont Hans Briegel Leon Brillouin Stephen Brush Henry Thomas Buckle S. H. Burbury Melvin Calvin Donald Campbell Sadi Carnot Anthony Cashmore Eric Chaisson Gregory Chaitin Jean-Pierre Changeux Rudolf Clausius Arthur Holly Compton John Conway Jerry Coyne John Cramer Francis Crick E. P. Culverwell Antonio Damasio Olivier Darrigol Charles Darwin Richard Dawkins Terrence Deacon Lüder Deecke Richard Dedekind Louis de Broglie Stanislas Dehaene Max Delbrück Abraham de Moivre Bernard d'Espagnat Paul Dirac Hans Driesch John Eccles Arthur Stanley Eddington Gerald Edelman Paul Ehrenfest Manfred Eigen Albert Einstein George F. R. Ellis Hugh Everett, III Franz Exner Richard Feynman R. A. Fisher David Foster Joseph Fourier Philipp Frank Steven Frautschi Edward Fredkin Benjamin Gal-Or Howard Gardner Lila Gatlin Michael Gazzaniga Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen GianCarlo Ghirardi J. Willard Gibbs James J. Gibson Nicolas Gisin Paul Glimcher Thomas Gold A. O. Gomes Brian Goodwin Joshua Greene Dirk ter Haar Jacques Hadamard Mark Hadley Patrick Haggard J. B. S. Haldane Stuart Hameroff Augustin Hamon Sam Harris Ralph Hartley Hyman Hartman Jeff Hawkins John-Dylan Haynes Donald Hebb Martin Heisenberg Werner Heisenberg John Herschel Basil Hiley Art Hobson Jesper Hoffmeyer Don Howard John H. Jackson William Stanley Jevons Roman Jakobson E. T. Jaynes Pascual Jordan Eric Kandel Ruth E. Kastner Stuart Kauffman Martin J. Klein William R. Klemm Christof Koch Simon Kochen Hans Kornhuber Stephen Kosslyn Daniel Koshland Ladislav Kovàč Leopold Kronecker Rolf Landauer Alfred Landé Pierre-Simon Laplace Karl Lashley David Layzer Joseph LeDoux Gerald Lettvin Gilbert Lewis Benjamin Libet David Lindley Seth Lloyd Werner Loewenstein Hendrik Lorentz Josef Loschmidt Alfred Lotka Ernst Mach Donald MacKay Henry Margenau Owen Maroney David Marr Humberto Maturana James Clerk Maxwell Ernst Mayr John McCarthy Warren McCulloch N. David Mermin George Miller Stanley Miller Ulrich Mohrhoff Jacques Monod Vernon Mountcastle Emmy Noether Donald Norman Alexander Oparin Abraham Pais Howard Pattee Wolfgang Pauli Massimo Pauri Wilder Penfield Roger Penrose Steven Pinker Colin Pittendrigh Walter Pitts Max Planck Susan Pockett Henri Poincaré Daniel Pollen Ilya Prigogine Hans Primas Zenon Pylyshyn Henry Quastler Adolphe Quételet Pasco Rakic Nicolas Rashevsky Lord Rayleigh Frederick Reif Jürgen Renn Giacomo Rizzolati A.A. Roback Emil Roduner Juan Roederer Jerome Rothstein David Ruelle David Rumelhart Robert Sapolsky Tilman Sauer Ferdinand de Saussure Jürgen Schmidhuber Erwin Schrödinger Aaron Schurger Sebastian Seung Thomas Sebeok Franco Selleri Claude Shannon Charles Sherrington David Shiang Abner Shimony Herbert Simon Dean Keith Simonton Edmund Sinnott B. F. Skinner Lee Smolin Ray Solomonoff Roger Sperry John Stachel Henry Stapp Tom Stonier Antoine Suarez Leo Szilard Max Tegmark Teilhard de Chardin Libb Thims William Thomson (Kelvin) Richard Tolman Giulio Tononi Peter Tse Alan Turing C. S. Unnikrishnan Francisco Varela Vlatko Vedral Vladimir Vernadsky Mikhail Volkenstein Heinz von Foerster Richard von Mises John von Neumann Jakob von Uexküll C. H. Waddington John B. Watson Daniel Wegner Steven Weinberg Paul A. Weiss Herman Weyl John Wheeler Jeffrey Wicken Wilhelm Wien Norbert Wiener Eugene Wigner E. O. Wilson Günther Witzany Stephen Wolfram H. Dieter Zeh Semir Zeki Ernst Zermelo Wojciech Zurek Konrad Zuse Fritz Zwicky Presentations Biosemiotics Free Will Mental Causation James Symposium |
Ludwig Wittgenstein
Wittgenstein's Picture Theory of Language
For Norman Malcolm's Ludwig Wittgenstein: A Memoir, G.H. von Wright wrote a biographical sketch recalling Wittgenstein's inspiration for his idea about language, that a proposition is a picture or model or mirror of reality.
Later he became engrossed in a new problem. It was the question of the nature of the significant proposition. There is a story of how the idea of language as a picture of reality occurred to Wittgenstein. It was in the autumn of 1914 on the Eastern Front, Wittgenstein was reading, in a magazine about a lawsuit in Paris concerning an automobile accident. At the trial a miniature model of the accident was presented before the court. The model here served as a proposition, that is, as a description of a possible state of affairs. It has this function owing to a correspondence between the parts of the model (the miniature-houses, -cars, -people) and things (houses, cars, people) in reality. It now occurred to Wittgenstein that one might reverse the analogy and say that a proposition serves as a model or picture, by virtue of a similar correspondence between its parts and the world. The way in which the parts of the proposition are combined – the structure of the proposition – depicts a possible combination oi elements in reality, a possible state of affairs. Wittgenstein's Tractatus may be called a synthesis of the theory of truth-functions and the idea that language is a picture of reality.In his Notebooks entry for September 30, 1914, he wrote The general concept of the proposition carries with it a quite general concept of the co-ordination of proposition and situation: The solution to all my questions must be extremely simple. In the proposition a world is as it were put together experimentally. (As when in the law-court in Paris a motor-car accident is represented by means of dolls, etc.1) [Cf. 4.031.] This must yield the nature of truth straight away (if I were not blind). Let us think of hieroglyphic writing in which each word is a representation of what it stands for. Let us think also of the fact that actual pictures of situations can be right and wrong. [Cf. 4.016.]Wittgenstein's was not the first claim that a set of true propositions can contain knowledge of the physical world, that words can describe objects, but his Tractatus was surely the boldest:
Here Wittgenstein imagines a "model" theory, but language does not have a subset of the information in an object
4.01 The proposition is a picture of reality.Although language is an excellent tool for human communication, its arbitrary and ambiguous nature makes it ill-suited to represent the world directly. What Wittgenstein saw in the miniature model of the accident at the Paris trial was a dynamic information structure that was partially isomorphic with the information structure of the original accident. Such a model is completely language independent! It is sad that Wittgenstein proposed a picture theory of language, of language as a mirror of nature. As an excellent aeronautical engineer and architect, he knew that a working model is much more than a picture. He was very impressed by Heinrich Hertz's classic textbook The Principles of Mechanics, in which dynamical models played a large part. Wittgenstein might have anticipated our information philosophy, which is a model theory of information structures. Today our best models are interactive dynamic computational models visualizable as 3-dimensional animations of physical objects and living beings.
Here Wittgenstein sees that the model must have the same "mathematical multiplicity" or complexity as the state of affairs,
viz., similar information 4.04 In the proposition there must be exactly as many things distinguishable as there are in the state of affairs, which it represents. They must both possess the same logical (mathematical) multiplicity (cf. Hertz's Mechanics, on Dynamic Models).But there is no mapping, no isomorphism of information between words (propositions) and objects (states of affairs). The extraordinarily sophisticated connection between a word and object is made in human minds, mediated by the experience recorder and reproducer (ERR) in the mind/brain. Words stimulate some neurons to start firing and to play back relevant experiences including the object. By contrast, a dynamic information model of a part of the world is presented immediately to the mind as a look-alike and act-alike simulation. Without relevant experience recorded in the mind's ERR, words are mere noise.
For decades, Anglo-American analytic philosophers and ordinary language philosophers have thought that the major problems of philosophy are problems of language and logic, that complete understanding of the natural world could be obtained through a complete set of logical propositions.
The aging Bertand Russell, worried about the failure of his Principia Mathematica project to derive mathematics from logic, saw in Wittgenstein the young, bright, scientifically-trained mind that might be able to establish a logical foundation, not only for mathematics but for all science as well.
Over an agonizing seven-year period that included his military service in World War I, Wittgenstein wrote his brief Logische-Philosophische Abhandlung, named Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus by G. E. Moore. In it Wittgenstein claimed to have solved all the problems of philosophy (at least all that could be shown in logic).
Wittgenstein also claimed that such problems could not be said or thought (only shown), and so everything written in the Tractatus was strictly speaking nonsense (unsinnung). Everything that had not been said in the Tractatus, Wittgenstein claimed was his truly important work on ethics and the meaning of life.
Despite the negative result for logic, Russell used some of Wittgenstein's work to rewrite Principia Mathematica. It was published as revised by Russell and Whitehead, but shortly thereafter Whitehead disavowed the changes, all actually made by Russell alone. To add to Russell's difficulties, Wittgenstein accused him of misunderstanding the Tractatus and misusing it.
Nevertheless, there grew up around Wittgenstein and Russell (now not talking to one another) a school of philosophy that attracted a diverse group of European science-minded philosophers like Moritz Schlick and his Vienna Circle.
Although Wittgenstein saw his logical philosophy as a failure and turned his interest to the therapeutic use of language – language as a game, this school of logical positivism (based on Wittgenstein's logical atoms) and logical empiricism (based on verification of atomic facts) grew to dominate Anglo-American Analytic philosophy for several decades.
Wittgenstein and Free Will
Ludwig Wittgenstein may have done more to inhibit discussion of free will than any other 20th-century philosopher. He declared the problem of free will and the mind-body problem to be "pseudo-problems," which were to be "dis-solved" by careful attention to actual language use.
In section 5 of the Tractatus, Wittgenstein makes a number of statements that purport to describe the world, its future, and freedom of the will, all of them the consequence of propositions and what we can deduce or infer from them.
5. A proposition is a truth-function of elementary propositions. 5.1 Truth functions can be arranged in series.Wittgenstein asserts that truth-functions in a series are the basis of probability. 5.15 If Tr is the number of the truth-grounds of a proposition 'r', and if Trs is the number of the truth-grounds of a proposition 's' that are at the same time truth-grounds of 'r', then we call the ratio Trs : Tr the degree of probability that the proposition 'r' gives to the proposition s. 5.1511 There is no special object peculiar to probability propositions. 5.152 When propositions have no truth-arguments in common with one another, we call them independent of one another. Wittgenstein On Identity
5.53 Identity of the object I express by identity of the sign and not by means of a sign of identity. Difference of the objects by difference of the signs. 5.5301 That identity is not a relation between objects is obvious. This becomes very clear if, for example, one considers the proposition "(x) : fx . HOOK . x=a". What this proposition says is simply that only a satisfies the function f, and not that only such things satisfy the function f which have a certain relation to a. One could of course say that in fact only a has this relation to a, but in order to express this we should need the sign of identity itself. 5.5302 Russell's definition of "=" won't do; because according to it one cannot say that two objects have all their properties in common. (Even if this proposition is never true, it is nevertheless significant.) 5.5303 Roughly speaking: to say of two things that they are identical is nonsense, and to say of one thing that it is identical with itself is to say nothing. 5.532 And analogously: not "( EXISTS x, y) . f(x, y) . x=y", but "( EXISTS x) . f(x, x)"; and not Hypertext edition of the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus in English and German (C.K. Ogden translation, with Russell introduction) See also our growing bilingual translation of the Tractatus with annotations. Wittgenstein On the Good
"What is good is also divine. Queer as it sounds, that sums up my ethics", Monk, p.278) For Teachers
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