Philosophers
Mortimer Adler Rogers Albritton Alexander of Aphrodisias Samuel Alexander William Alston Anaximander G.E.M.Anscombe Anselm Louise Antony Thomas Aquinas Aristotle David Armstrong Harald Atmanspacher Robert Audi Augustine J.L.Austin A.J.Ayer Alexander Bain Mark Balaguer Jeffrey Barrett William Barrett William Belsham Henri Bergson George Berkeley Isaiah Berlin Richard J. Bernstein Bernard Berofsky Robert Bishop Max Black Susanne Bobzien Emil du Bois-Reymond Hilary Bok Laurence BonJour George Boole Émile Boutroux Daniel Boyd F.H.Bradley C.D.Broad Michael Burke Lawrence Cahoone C.A.Campbell Joseph Keim Campbell Rudolf Carnap Carneades Nancy Cartwright Gregg Caruso Ernst Cassirer David Chalmers Roderick Chisholm Chrysippus Cicero Randolph Clarke Samuel Clarke Anthony Collins Antonella Corradini Diodorus Cronus Jonathan Dancy Donald Davidson Mario De Caro Democritus Daniel Dennett Jacques Derrida René Descartes Richard Double Fred Dretske John Dupré John Earman Laura Waddell Ekstrom Epictetus Epicurus Austin Farrer Herbert Feigl Arthur Fine John Martin Fischer Frederic Fitch Owen Flanagan Luciano Floridi Philippa Foot Alfred Fouilleé Harry Frankfurt Richard L. Franklin Bas van Fraassen Michael Frede Gottlob Frege Peter Geach Edmund Gettier Carl Ginet Alvin Goldman Gorgias Nicholas St. John Green H.Paul Grice Ian Hacking Ishtiyaque Haji Stuart Hampshire W.F.R.Hardie Sam Harris William Hasker R.M.Hare Georg W.F. Hegel Martin Heidegger Heraclitus R.E.Hobart Thomas Hobbes David Hodgson Shadsworth Hodgson Baron d'Holbach Ted Honderich Pamela Huby David Hume Ferenc Huoranszki Frank Jackson William James Lord Kames Robert Kane Immanuel Kant Tomis Kapitan Walter Kaufmann Jaegwon Kim William King Hilary Kornblith Christine Korsgaard Saul Kripke Thomas Kuhn Andrea Lavazza Christoph Lehner Keith Lehrer Gottfried Leibniz Jules Lequyer Leucippus Michael Levin Joseph Levine George Henry Lewes C.I.Lewis David Lewis Peter Lipton C. Lloyd Morgan John Locke Michael Lockwood Arthur O. Lovejoy E. Jonathan Lowe John R. Lucas Lucretius Alasdair MacIntyre Ruth Barcan Marcus Tim Maudlin James Martineau Nicholas Maxwell Storrs McCall Hugh McCann Colin McGinn Michael McKenna Brian McLaughlin John McTaggart Paul E. Meehl Uwe Meixner Alfred Mele Trenton Merricks John Stuart Mill Dickinson Miller G.E.Moore Thomas Nagel Otto Neurath Friedrich Nietzsche John Norton P.H.Nowell-Smith Robert Nozick William of Ockham Timothy O'Connor Parmenides David F. Pears Charles Sanders Peirce Derk Pereboom Steven Pinker Plato Karl Popper Porphyry Huw Price H.A.Prichard Protagoras Hilary Putnam Willard van Orman Quine Frank Ramsey Ayn Rand Michael Rea Thomas Reid Charles Renouvier Nicholas Rescher C.W.Rietdijk Richard Rorty Josiah Royce Bertrand Russell Paul Russell Gilbert Ryle Jean-Paul Sartre Kenneth Sayre T.M.Scanlon Moritz Schlick Arthur Schopenhauer John Searle Wilfrid Sellars Alan Sidelle Ted Sider Henry Sidgwick Walter Sinnott-Armstrong J.J.C.Smart Saul Smilansky Michael Smith Baruch Spinoza L. Susan Stebbing Isabelle Stengers George F. Stout Galen Strawson Peter Strawson Eleonore Stump Francisco Suárez Richard Taylor Kevin Timpe Mark Twain Peter Unger Peter van Inwagen Manuel Vargas John Venn Kadri Vihvelin Voltaire G.H. von Wright David Foster Wallace R. Jay Wallace W.G.Ward Ted Warfield Roy Weatherford C.F. von Weizsäcker William Whewell Alfred North Whitehead David Widerker David Wiggins Bernard Williams Timothy Williamson Ludwig Wittgenstein Susan Wolf Scientists David Albert Michael Arbib Walter Baade Bernard Baars Jeffrey Bada Leslie Ballentine Marcello Barbieri Gregory Bateson John S. Bell Mara Beller Charles Bennett Ludwig von Bertalanffy Susan Blackmore Margaret Boden David Bohm Niels Bohr Ludwig Boltzmann Emile Borel Max Born Satyendra Nath Bose Walther Bothe Jean Bricmont Hans Briegel Leon Brillouin Stephen Brush Henry Thomas Buckle S. H. Burbury Melvin Calvin Donald Campbell Sadi Carnot Anthony Cashmore Eric Chaisson Gregory Chaitin Jean-Pierre Changeux Rudolf Clausius Arthur Holly Compton John Conway Jerry Coyne John Cramer Francis Crick E. P. Culverwell Antonio Damasio Olivier Darrigol Charles Darwin Richard Dawkins Terrence Deacon Lüder Deecke Richard Dedekind Louis de Broglie Stanislas Dehaene Max Delbrück Abraham de Moivre Bernard d'Espagnat Paul Dirac Hans Driesch John Eccles Arthur Stanley Eddington Gerald Edelman Paul Ehrenfest Manfred Eigen Albert Einstein George F. R. Ellis Hugh Everett, III Franz Exner Richard Feynman R. A. Fisher David Foster Joseph Fourier Philipp Frank Steven Frautschi Edward Fredkin Benjamin Gal-Or Lila Gatlin Michael Gazzaniga Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen GianCarlo Ghirardi J. Willard Gibbs Nicolas Gisin Paul Glimcher Thomas Gold A. O. Gomes Brian Goodwin Joshua Greene Dirk ter Haar Jacques Hadamard Mark Hadley Patrick Haggard J. B. S. Haldane Stuart Hameroff Augustin Hamon Sam Harris Ralph Hartley Hyman Hartman John-Dylan Haynes Donald Hebb Martin Heisenberg Werner Heisenberg John Herschel Basil Hiley Art Hobson Jesper Hoffmeyer Don Howard William Stanley Jevons Roman Jakobson E. T. Jaynes Pascual Jordan Ruth E. Kastner Stuart Kauffman Martin J. Klein William R. Klemm Christof Koch Simon Kochen Hans Kornhuber Stephen Kosslyn Daniel Koshland Ladislav Kovàč Leopold Kronecker Rolf Landauer Alfred Landé Pierre-Simon Laplace David Layzer Joseph LeDoux Gilbert Lewis Benjamin Libet David Lindley Seth Lloyd Hendrik Lorentz Josef Loschmidt Ernst Mach Donald MacKay Henry Margenau Owen Maroney Humberto Maturana James Clerk Maxwell Ernst Mayr John McCarthy Warren McCulloch N. David Mermin George Miller Stanley Miller Ulrich Mohrhoff Jacques Monod Emmy Noether Alexander Oparin Abraham Pais Howard Pattee Wolfgang Pauli Massimo Pauri Roger Penrose Steven Pinker Colin Pittendrigh Max Planck Susan Pockett Henri Poincaré Daniel Pollen Ilya Prigogine Hans Primas Henry Quastler Adolphe Quételet Lord Rayleigh Jürgen Renn Emil Roduner Juan Roederer Jerome Rothstein David Ruelle Tilman Sauer Jürgen Schmidhuber Erwin Schrödinger Aaron Schurger Sebastian Seung Thomas Sebeok Franco Selleri Claude Shannon Charles Sherrington David Shiang Abner Shimony Herbert Simon Dean Keith Simonton Edmund Sinnott B. F. Skinner Lee Smolin Ray Solomonoff Roger Sperry John Stachel Henry Stapp Tom Stonier Antoine Suarez Leo Szilard Max Tegmark Teilhard de Chardin Libb Thims William Thomson (Kelvin) Richard Tolman Giulio Tononi Peter Tse Francisco Varela Vlatko Vedral Mikhail Volkenstein Heinz von Foerster Richard von Mises John von Neumann Jakob von Uexküll C. S. Unnikrishnan C. H. Waddington John B. Watson Daniel Wegner Steven Weinberg Paul A. Weiss Herman Weyl John Wheeler Wilhelm Wien Norbert Wiener Eugene Wigner E. O. Wilson Günther Witzany Stephen Wolfram H. Dieter Zeh Ernst Zermelo Wojciech Zurek Konrad Zuse Fritz Zwicky Presentations Biosemiotics Free Will Mental Causation James Symposium |
Indeterminism and Free Will
(Nature, Vol. 138, No. 3479, pp.13-14, July 4, 1936)
It has become the orthodox view of physicists to-day, that the momentary state of a physical system does not determine its movement or development or behaviour, to follow; Nature is supposed to be such that a knowledge of state, sufficiently accurate for sharp prediction of the future, is not only unobtainable but also unthinkable. All that can be predicted refers to a large number of identical experiments, and consists in a definite statistics among all the possible developments to follow. The relative margin of indeterminacy (the 'spread' of the statistics) is large for a small system, for example, for an atom; but for large systems the margin is usually, though not necessarily, small, which makes it possible to account for the apparent determinacy of inanimate Nature.
Many eminent scientific workers, especially physicists, have tried to play with the idea that the apparent indeterminacy of animate Nature, that is, of living matter, might be connected with the theoretical indeterminacy of modern physics. What makes this play so fascinating and thrilling is evidently the hope (whether outspoken or concealed) of extracting from the new physical dogma a model of free-will, which the old one would refuse to yield. I consider this hope an illusion, for the following general reasons.
When observed objectively in other creatures, free-will actions do not call for a special 'indeterminist' explanation any more than other events. When two persons (or the same person on different occasions) react differently under apparently the same conditions, we feel compelled to account for it, whether the reaction is a passive or an active one, by a real, though unknown, difference of conditions, including, of course, character and temporary disposition on the part of the reacting persons. A poet unrolling before us the objective picture of free-will actions is just as concerned about proper causation (here called motivation) as the classical physicist was for inanimate Nature.
On the other hand, when regarded as a fact of self-observation, free-will has quite a different standing from scientific experience. The two are, as it were, in different planes, which do not intersect. Self-observed free-will I would analyse into two facts. First, indeed, a prediction, but not based on previous experience, certainly not in the way in which scientific prediction is. If I am the actor, I just know what is going to happen, and that, apart from pathological cases, with the greatest amount of certainty which is ever met with in life. The second fact is a moral one. I feel responsible for what happens.
Now, it is true that this absolute prescience is a matter only of the very last moment before or when the action sets in, which it rather accompanies than precedes. Before that there is frequently doubt and even entire ignorance ('hesitation'). This antecedent period, together with the remarkable feeling of responsibility, entails the idea of choice between different possibilities for which a clue is sought in the modern views of physics. If that were right, it would mean either one of two things.
Schrödinger makes the common error of assuming chance is the direct cause of action
First, that the laws of Nature are after all at "my" mercy. For if my smoking or not smoking a cigarette before breakfast (a very wicked thing!) were a matter of Heisenberg's uncertainty principle, the latter would stipulate between the two events a definite statistics, say 30:70; which I could invalidate by firmness. Or, secondly, if that is denied, why on earth do I feel responsible for what I do, since the frequency of my sinning is determined by Heisenberg's principle? The new physics does not shift St. Augustin's paradox by a hair's breadth.
In my opinion the whole analogy is fallacious, because the plurality of possible events, in the case of an action under free-will, is a self-deception. Think of cases such as the following: you are sitting at it formal dinner, with important persons, terribly boring. Could you, all at once, jump on the table and trample down the glasses and dishes, just for fun? Perhaps you could: maybe you feel like it: at any rate you cannot. Then, which of the virtually possible events are to be called possible under the auspices of free-will? I would say, just the one that actually follows.
Against this view cases might be quoted where the decision is really difficult, serious, painful, bewildering, when we are down on our knees before the Almighty to forgo it. But in this He is inexorable!
no ψ-function in life! - this from the creator of Schrödinger's Cat
We must decide. One thing must happen, will happen, life goes on. There is no ψ-function in life. I have always considered this having-to-decide as a strikingly close subjective correlate to the classical, the deterministic model of Nature. It ought to be emphasized that modern physics does not compel us to abandon this correlation. The material units which determine the processes of life seem to be large enough for - possibly and even probably - safeguarding the essential course of these processes against any perceptible direct and immediate manifestation of the Heisenberg uncertainty.
The preceding remarks have been elicited by the first page of a highly interesting sketch by Prof. F. G. Donnan, "Integral Analysis and the Phenomena of Life" (Acta Biotheoretica, Series A, vol. 2, Pars I, 1936; Leyden: E. J. Brill), though not by way of contradiction. Prof. Donnan is not concerned with the question of free-will. His idea is that an organism is to be regarded as a 'historical' system, whose reactions at a given moment are not determined alone by its surroundings and by its momentary state, but also by what has happened to that organism during a certain previous period. This is a highly attractive view, and the mathematical treatment proposed by Prof. Donnan a very suggestive one - even if one should hesitate to agree with the view (which he considers essential) that some of the historical traces are not engraved in the momentary state otherwise than by modifying its reactivity.
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