Philosophers
Mortimer Adler Rogers Albritton Alexander of Aphrodisias Samuel Alexander William Alston Anaximander G.E.M.Anscombe Anselm Louise Antony Thomas Aquinas Aristotle David Armstrong Harald Atmanspacher Robert Audi Augustine J.L.Austin A.J.Ayer Alexander Bain Mark Balaguer Jeffrey Barrett William Barrett William Belsham Henri Bergson George Berkeley Isaiah Berlin Richard J. Bernstein Bernard Berofsky Robert Bishop Max Black Susanne Bobzien Emil du Bois-Reymond Hilary Bok Laurence BonJour George Boole Émile Boutroux Daniel Boyd F.H.Bradley C.D.Broad Michael Burke Jeremy Butterfield Lawrence Cahoone C.A.Campbell Joseph Keim Campbell Rudolf Carnap Carneades Nancy Cartwright Gregg Caruso Ernst Cassirer David Chalmers Roderick Chisholm Chrysippus Cicero Tom Clark Randolph Clarke Samuel Clarke Anthony Collins Antonella Corradini Diodorus Cronus Jonathan Dancy Donald Davidson Mario De Caro Democritus Daniel Dennett Jacques Derrida René Descartes Richard Double Fred Dretske John Dupré John Earman Laura Waddell Ekstrom Epictetus Epicurus Austin Farrer Herbert Feigl Arthur Fine John Martin Fischer Frederic Fitch Owen Flanagan Luciano Floridi Philippa Foot Alfred Fouilleé Harry Frankfurt Richard L. Franklin Bas van Fraassen Michael Frede Gottlob Frege Peter Geach Edmund Gettier Carl Ginet Alvin Goldman Gorgias Nicholas St. John Green H.Paul Grice Ian Hacking Ishtiyaque Haji Stuart Hampshire W.F.R.Hardie Sam Harris William Hasker R.M.Hare Georg W.F. Hegel Martin Heidegger Heraclitus R.E.Hobart Thomas Hobbes David Hodgson Shadsworth Hodgson Baron d'Holbach Ted Honderich Pamela Huby David Hume Ferenc Huoranszki Frank Jackson William James Lord Kames Robert Kane Immanuel Kant Tomis Kapitan Walter Kaufmann Jaegwon Kim William King Hilary Kornblith Christine Korsgaard Saul Kripke Thomas Kuhn Andrea Lavazza Christoph Lehner Keith Lehrer Gottfried Leibniz Jules Lequyer Leucippus Michael Levin Joseph Levine George Henry Lewes C.I.Lewis David Lewis Peter Lipton C. Lloyd Morgan John Locke Michael Lockwood Arthur O. Lovejoy E. Jonathan Lowe John R. Lucas Lucretius Alasdair MacIntyre Ruth Barcan Marcus Tim Maudlin James Martineau Nicholas Maxwell Storrs McCall Hugh McCann Colin McGinn Michael McKenna Brian McLaughlin John McTaggart Paul E. Meehl Uwe Meixner Alfred Mele Trenton Merricks John Stuart Mill Dickinson Miller G.E.Moore Thomas Nagel Otto Neurath Friedrich Nietzsche John Norton P.H.Nowell-Smith Robert Nozick William of Ockham Timothy O'Connor Parmenides David F. Pears Charles Sanders Peirce Derk Pereboom Steven Pinker U.T.Place Plato Karl Popper Porphyry Huw Price H.A.Prichard Protagoras Hilary Putnam Willard van Orman Quine Frank Ramsey Ayn Rand Michael Rea Thomas Reid Charles Renouvier Nicholas Rescher C.W.Rietdijk Richard Rorty Josiah Royce Bertrand Russell Paul Russell Gilbert Ryle Jean-Paul Sartre Kenneth Sayre T.M.Scanlon Moritz Schlick John Duns Scotus Arthur Schopenhauer John Searle Wilfrid Sellars David Shiang Alan Sidelle Ted Sider Henry Sidgwick Walter Sinnott-Armstrong Peter Slezak J.J.C.Smart Saul Smilansky Michael Smith Baruch Spinoza L. Susan Stebbing Isabelle Stengers George F. Stout Galen Strawson Peter Strawson Eleonore Stump Francisco Suárez Richard Taylor Kevin Timpe Mark Twain Peter Unger Peter van Inwagen Manuel Vargas John Venn Kadri Vihvelin Voltaire G.H. von Wright David Foster Wallace R. Jay Wallace W.G.Ward Ted Warfield Roy Weatherford C.F. von Weizsäcker William Whewell Alfred North Whitehead David Widerker David Wiggins Bernard Williams Timothy Williamson Ludwig Wittgenstein Susan Wolf Scientists David Albert Michael Arbib Walter Baade Bernard Baars Jeffrey Bada Leslie Ballentine Marcello Barbieri Gregory Bateson Horace Barlow John S. Bell Mara Beller Charles Bennett Ludwig von Bertalanffy Susan Blackmore Margaret Boden David Bohm Niels Bohr Ludwig Boltzmann Emile Borel Max Born Satyendra Nath Bose Walther Bothe Jean Bricmont Hans Briegel Leon Brillouin Stephen Brush Henry Thomas Buckle S. H. Burbury Melvin Calvin Donald Campbell Sadi Carnot Anthony Cashmore Eric Chaisson Gregory Chaitin Jean-Pierre Changeux Rudolf Clausius Arthur Holly Compton John Conway Jerry Coyne John Cramer Francis Crick E. P. Culverwell Antonio Damasio Olivier Darrigol Charles Darwin Richard Dawkins Terrence Deacon Lüder Deecke Richard Dedekind Louis de Broglie Stanislas Dehaene Max Delbrück Abraham de Moivre Bernard d'Espagnat Paul Dirac Hans Driesch John Eccles Arthur Stanley Eddington Gerald Edelman Paul Ehrenfest Manfred Eigen Albert Einstein George F. R. Ellis Hugh Everett, III Franz Exner Richard Feynman R. A. Fisher David Foster Joseph Fourier Philipp Frank Steven Frautschi Edward Fredkin Augustin-Jean Fresnel Benjamin Gal-Or Howard Gardner Lila Gatlin Michael Gazzaniga Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen GianCarlo Ghirardi J. Willard Gibbs James J. Gibson Nicolas Gisin Paul Glimcher Thomas Gold A. O. Gomes Brian Goodwin Joshua Greene Dirk ter Haar Jacques Hadamard Mark Hadley Patrick Haggard J. B. S. Haldane Stuart Hameroff Augustin Hamon Sam Harris Ralph Hartley Hyman Hartman Jeff Hawkins John-Dylan Haynes Donald Hebb Martin Heisenberg Werner Heisenberg John Herschel Basil Hiley Art Hobson Jesper Hoffmeyer Don Howard John H. Jackson William Stanley Jevons Roman Jakobson E. T. Jaynes Pascual Jordan Eric Kandel Ruth E. Kastner Stuart Kauffman Martin J. Klein William R. Klemm Christof Koch Simon Kochen Hans Kornhuber Stephen Kosslyn Daniel Koshland Ladislav Kovàč Leopold Kronecker Rolf Landauer Alfred Landé Pierre-Simon Laplace Karl Lashley David Layzer Joseph LeDoux Gerald Lettvin Gilbert Lewis Benjamin Libet David Lindley Seth Lloyd Werner Loewenstein Hendrik Lorentz Josef Loschmidt Alfred Lotka Ernst Mach Donald MacKay Henry Margenau Owen Maroney David Marr Humberto Maturana James Clerk Maxwell Ernst Mayr John McCarthy Warren McCulloch N. David Mermin George Miller Stanley Miller Ulrich Mohrhoff Jacques Monod Vernon Mountcastle Emmy Noether Donald Norman Alexander Oparin Abraham Pais Howard Pattee Wolfgang Pauli Massimo Pauri Wilder Penfield Roger Penrose Steven Pinker Colin Pittendrigh Walter Pitts Max Planck Susan Pockett Henri Poincaré Daniel Pollen Ilya Prigogine Hans Primas Zenon Pylyshyn Henry Quastler Adolphe Quételet Pasco Rakic Nicolas Rashevsky Lord Rayleigh Frederick Reif Jürgen Renn Giacomo Rizzolati A.A. Roback Emil Roduner Juan Roederer Jerome Rothstein David Ruelle David Rumelhart Robert Sapolsky Tilman Sauer Ferdinand de Saussure Jürgen Schmidhuber Erwin Schrödinger Aaron Schurger Sebastian Seung Thomas Sebeok Franco Selleri Claude Shannon Charles Sherrington Abner Shimony Herbert Simon Dean Keith Simonton Edmund Sinnott B. F. Skinner Lee Smolin Ray Solomonoff Roger Sperry John Stachel Henry Stapp Tom Stonier Antoine Suarez Leo Szilard Max Tegmark Teilhard de Chardin Libb Thims William Thomson (Kelvin) Richard Tolman Giulio Tononi Peter Tse Alan Turing C. S. Unnikrishnan Francisco Varela Vlatko Vedral Vladimir Vernadsky Mikhail Volkenstein Heinz von Foerster Richard von Mises John von Neumann Jakob von Uexküll C. H. Waddington John B. Watson Daniel Wegner Steven Weinberg Paul A. Weiss Herman Weyl John Wheeler Jeffrey Wicken Wilhelm Wien Norbert Wiener Eugene Wigner E. O. Wilson Günther Witzany Stephen Wolfram H. Dieter Zeh Semir Zeki Ernst Zermelo Wojciech Zurek Konrad Zuse Fritz Zwicky Presentations Biosemiotics Free Will Mental Causation James Symposium |
Jules Lequyer
Jules Lequyer was a French theologian and philosopher who anticipated much of today's "open theism, the idea that the future of the universe is "open," that God's foreknowledge at best knows about multiple alternative possibilities.
In particular, perhaps influenced by Calcidius, the 4th-century translator of Plato's Timaeus, with its description of creation ex nihilo, Lequyer argued that human beings are creative only if they are free to choose among those future possibilities.
Although Cicero had translated some of the Timaeus, Calcidius' Latin translation was the only known source into medieval scholasticism, so it influenced religious thought through the nineteenth century, including especially Lequyer and the German thinkers Gustav Fechner and Otto Pfliederer, both of whom argued that God could not know the future and also have power over it.
The idea that "God cannot change his Mind" was the source for Augustinian and Calvinist determinism, even if scripture explicitly says "amend your ways and the Lord will repent the evil that he hath pronounced against you." (Jeremiah 26:13)
Anselm was an exception. In his Concordium on Free Will, objected to determinism because something eternal is immutable, but something in time is mutable.
The familiar idea of God as an
omniscient and omnipotent being has an internal logical
contradiction that is rarely discussed by theologians.
If such a being had perfect knowledge of the future, like
Laplace’s demon, who knows the positions, velocities, and
forces for all the particles, it would be perfectly impotent.
Because if God has the power to change even one thing
about the future, his presumed perfect knowledge would
have been imperfect.
Omniscience entails impotence. Omnipotence some ignorance. Prayer is useless.
As to omnibenevolence, Archibald MacLeish said in J.B, “If
God is Good, He is not God. If God is God, He is Not Good.”
Lequyer's connection of freedom to human creativity "to make, and in making, to make ourselves," is the core insight of information philosophy. Creativity, the generation of new information in the universe, whether a quantum measurement or a new idea, must involve indeterminism
Information is neither matter nor energy, although it needs matter to be embodied and energy to be communicated. Why should it become the preferred basis for all philosophy? As most all of us know, matter and energy are conserved. This means that there is just the same total amount of matter and energy today as there was at the universe origin. But then what accounts for all the change that we see, the new things under the sun? It is information, which is not conserved and has been increasing since the beginning of time, despite the second law of thermodynamics, with its increasing entropy, which destroys order. What is changing is the arrangement of the matter into what we can call information structures. What is emerging is new information. What idealists and holists see is that emergence of immaterial information. Living things, you and I, are dynamic growing information structures, forms through which matter and energy continuously flow. And it is information processing that controls those flows! At the lowest levels, living information structures blindly replicate their information. At higher levels, natural selection adapts them to their environments. At the highest levels, living things develop behaviors, intentions, goals, and agency, introducing purpose into the universe. Information is the modern spirit, the ghost in the machine, the mind in the body. It is the soul, and when we die, it is our information that perishes, unless the future preserves it. The matter remains.Lequyer was a great influence on Charles Renouvier and William James, perhaps indirectly on the process philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead, and on the idea of emergence, that new things are constantly being created, including what William Hasker calls the "emergent self." Without such a self-creation, moral philosophers question the existence of responsibility for our actions.
Excerpt from "Hornbeam Leaf."
One day, in my father’s garden, at the moment of taking a hornbeam leaf, I suddenly marveled at feeling myself to be the absolute master of this action, insignificant though it was. To do or not to do! both so equally within my power! A single cause, me, capable at a single instant, as though I were double, of two completely opposite effects! and, by one, or by the other, author of something eternal, for whatever my choice, it would henceforth be eternally true that something would have taken place at this point of time that it had pleased me to decide. I was not equal to my astonishment; I drew back, I recovered, my heart beating precipitously. I was going to put my hand on the branch, and create in good faith, without knowing it, a mode of being, when I raised my eyes and paused at a slight noise coming from the foliage. A frightened bird had taken flight. To fly away was to perish. A sparrow hawk passing by seized it in midair. I am the one who had handed it over, I said to myself with sadness. The caprice which made me touch this branch and not another had caused its death... But what if this present determination, rather than initiating a train of events, merely continues the past train of events by an other, from long ago certain for some being superior to me, and occurring in its time in this general order that I have not in any way made? If I seem sovereign in my innermost heart, was this at base, to not feel my dependence? What if each of my acts of will was an effect before being a cause, so that this choice, this free choice, this choice that is apparently as free as chance, might have really been (having in it nothing of chance) the inevitable consequence of an anterior choice, and that choice the consequence of another, and always the same, to trace backward to times of which I had no memory? This weighed in my spirit like the dawn full of sadness of the coming day. An idea . . . Ah! what an idea! What a vision! I am fascinated by it.... I understood the fallacy of muttering these ridiculous words at the moment of acting: Let us ponder, let us see what I am going to do Were I to seriously reflect, I would no more succeed in becoming the author of my acts by means of my reflections than my reflections by means of my reflections; if I was occasionally overrun by the feeling of my power—for I have yet the feeling of my own power—it is only the feeling of its passage in me and it submerges me in its waves, the power employed to hold together this universal ebb and flow. I knew that, not being my own principle, I was the principle of nothing. I knew that my defect and my weakness were to have been made. I knew that whoever had been made, had been made stripped of the noble faculty of making. I knew that the sublime, the miracle as well, alas! the impossible, was to act: no matter where within me and no matter how, but to act; to give a first push, to will a first act of will, to begin something in some fashion (of what might I have been capable if 1 might have been capable of something!), to act, one time, entirely of my own authority, that is to say to act. And feeling, by the pain of losing the illusion, the joy that one would have had to possess so beautiful a privilege, I found myself reduced to the role of spectator, by turns amused and saddened by a changing tableau which took shape in me without me, and which, sometimes faithful and sometimes lying, showed me, under the appearances ever equivocal, both myself and the world, to me always credulous, and always powerless to suspect my present error or to regain the truth. There was only this truth, now so clear to my eyes, of my invincible powerlessness to ever defeat any error, if by another error, I tried any useless and inevitable effort. A single idea, a single idea, reverberated everywhere, a single sun with uniform rays: what I had done was necessary. This that I think is necessary. The absolute necessity for that which is to be at the instant and in the manner that it is, with this formidable consequence: good and evil confounded, equal, fruits born of the same sap and the same stalk. At this idea, which repulsed my entire being I uttered a cry of distress and terror. The leaf fell from my hands, and as though I had touched the tree of knowledge, I lowered my head and wept. Suddenly I raised it again. Recovering my faith in my freedom by my freedom itself, without reasoning, without hesitation, without any other gauge of the excellence of my nature than this inner testimony that makes my soul created in the image of God and capable of resisting him, since it should obey him, I said to myself, in the security of a superb solitude: This is not so, I am free. And the chimera of necessity disappeared, similar to the phantoms formed during the night by a play of shadow and light from the hearth, which immobilize the child with fear under their flamboyant eyes, who is woken with a start, still half lost in a dream. Accomplice to the magic spell, he ignores the fact that he held it together himself by the fixity of his point of view, but as soon as he doubts it, he dispels it with a glance upon the first movement that he dares to make.Normal | Teacher | Scholar |