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Core Concepts
Adequate Determinism Agent-Causality Alternative Possibilities Causa Sui Causal Closure Causality Certainty Chance Chance Not Direct Cause Chaos Theory The Cogito Model Compatibilism Complexity Comprehensive Compatibilism Conceptual Analysis Control Could Do Otherwise Creativity Default Responsibility De-liberation Determination Determination Fallacy Determinism Disambiguation Double Effect Either Way Emergent Determinism Epistemic Freedom Ethical Fallacy Experimental Philosophy Extreme Libertarianism Event Has Many Causes Frankfurt Cases Free Choice Freedom of Action "Free Will" Free Will Axiom Free Will in Antiquity Free Will Mechanisms Free Will Requirements Free Will Theorem Future Contingency Hard Incompatibilism Idea of Freedom Illusion of Determinism Illusionism Impossibilism Incompatibilism Indeterminacy Indeterminism Infinities Laplace's Demon Libertarianism Liberty of Indifference Libet Experiments Luck Master Argument Modest Libertarianism Moral Necessity Moral Responsibility Moral Sentiments Mysteries Naturalism Necessity Noise Non-Causality Nonlocality Origination Paradigm Case Possibilities Pre-determinism Predictability Probability Pseudo-Problem Random When?/Where? Rational Fallacy Refutations Replay Responsibility Same Circumstances Scandal Science Advance Fallacy Second Thoughts Self-Determination Semicompatibilism Separability Soft Causality Special Relativity Standard Argument Taxonomy Temporal Sequence Tertium Quid Torn Decision Two-Stage Models Ultimate Responsibility Uncertainty Up To Us Voluntarism Philosophers Mortimer Adler Rogers Albritton Alexander of Aphrodisias G.E.M.Anscombe Anselm Thomas Aquinas Aristotle David Armstrong Harald Atmanspacher Augustine J.L.Austin A.J.Ayer Alexander Bain Mark Balaguer Jeffrey Barrett William Belsham Henri Bergson Isaiah Berlin Bernard Berofsky Robert Bishop Susanne Bobzien Emil du Bois-Reymond Hilary Bok George Boole Émile Boutroux F.H.Bradley C.D.Broad C.A.Campbell Joseph Keim Campbell Carneades Ernst Cassirer David Chalmers Roderick Chisholm Chrysippus Cicero Randolph Clarke Samuel Clarke Anthony Collins Antonella Corradini Diodorus Cronus Jonathan Dancy Donald Davidson Democritus Daniel Dennett René Descartes Richard Double Fred Dretske John Dupré John Earman Laura Waddell Ekstrom Epictetus Epicurus Herbert Feigl John Martin Fischer Owen Flanagan Luciano Floridi Philippa Foot Alfred Fouilleé Harry Frankfurt Richard L. Franklin Michael Frede Carl Ginet Nicholas St. John Green H.Paul Grice Ian Hacking Ishtiyaque Haji Stuart Hampshire W.F.R.Hardie William Hasker R.M.Hare Georg W.F. Hegel Martin Heidegger R.E.Hobart Thomas Hobbes David Hodgson Shadsworth Hodgson Ted Honderich Pamela Huby David Hume Ferenc Huoranszki William James Lord Kames Robert Kane Immanuel Kant Tomis Kapitan Jaegwon Kim William King Christine Korsgaard Keith Lehrer Gottfried Leibniz Leucippus Michael Levin C.I.Lewis David Lewis Peter Lipton John Locke Michael Lockwood E. Jonathan Lowe John R. Lucas Lucretius James Martineau Storrs McCall Hugh McCann Colin McGinn Michael McKenna Paul E. Meehl Uwe Meixner Alfred Mele John Stuart Mill Dickinson Miller G.E.Moore Thomas Nagel Friedrich Nietzsche P.H.Nowell-Smith Robert Nozick William of Ockham Timothy O'Connor David F. Pears Charles Sanders Peirce Derk Pereboom Steven Pinker Plato Karl Popper H.A.Prichard Hilary Putnam Willard van Orman Quine Frank Ramsey Ayn Rand Thomas Reid Charles Renouvier Nicholas Rescher C.W.Rietdijk Josiah Royce Bertrand Russell Paul Russell Gilbert Ryle Kenneth Sayre T.M.Scanlon Moritz Schlick Arthur Schopenhauer John Searle Wilfrid Sellars Henry Sidgwick Walter Sinnott-Armstrong J.J.C.Smart Saul Smilansky Michael Smith L. Susan Stebbing George F. Stout Galen Strawson Peter Strawson Eleonore Stump Richard Taylor Kevin Timpe Mark Twain Peter van Inwagen Manuel Vargas John Venn Kadri Vihvelin Voltaire G.H. von Wright David Foster Wallace R. Jay Wallace W.G.Ward Ted Warfield Roy Weatherford William Whewell Alfred North Whitehead David Widerker David Wiggins Bernard Williams Ludwig Wittgenstein Susan Wolf Scientists Michael Arbib Bernard Baars John S. Bell Charles Bennett Ludwig von Bertalanffy Susan Blackmore Margaret Boden David Bohm Niels Bohr Ludwig Boltzmann Emile Borel Max Born Walther Bothe Hans Briegel Leon Brillouin Stephen Brush Henry Thomas Buckle Donald Campbell Anthony Cashmore Eric Chaisson Jean-Pierre Changeux Arthur Holly Compton John Conway E. H. Culverwell Charles Darwin Terrence Deacon Abraham de Moivre Paul Dirac Hans Driesch John Eccles Arthur Stanley Eddington Paul Ehrenfest Albert Einstein Hugh Everett, III Franz Exner Richard Feynman Joseph Fourier Michael Gazzaniga GianCarlo Ghirardi Nicolas Gisin Paul Glimcher Thomas Gold A.O.Gomes Joshua Greene Jacques Hadamard Stuart Hameroff Patrick Haggard Augustin Hamon Sam Harris Martin Heisenberg Werner Heisenberg William Stanley Jevons Pascual Jordan Simon Kochen Stephen Kosslyn Rolf Landauer Alfred Landé Pierre-Simon Laplace David Layzer Benjamin Libet Josef Loschmidt Ernst Mach Henry Margenau James Clerk Maxwell Ernst Mayr Ulrich Mohrhoff Jacques Monod Wolfgang Pauli Roger Penrose Steven Pinker Max Planck Henri Poincaré Adolphe Quételet Jerome Rothstein David Ruelle Erwin Schrödinger Aaron Schurger Claude Shannon Herbert Simon Dean Keith Simonton B. F. Skinner Roger Sperry Henry Stapp Antoine Suarez Leo Szilard William Thomson (Kelvin) Peter Tse John von Neumann Daniel Wegner Steven Weinberg Paul A. Weiss Norbert Wiener Eugene Wigner E. O. Wilson H. Dieter Zeh Ernst Zermelo |
Liberty of Indifference
Liberty of Indifference (liberum arbitrium indifferentiae) is for some philosophers an effort to identify "liberty" as merely some form of indeterminism or chance. This argument is popular with determinist and compatibilist philosophers who want to show that this kind of free will is not worth having.
For some philosophers of mind, it is an example of a mechanical equilibrium so finely balanced that even an immaterial mind could push the body in one direction or the other.
Liberty of Indifference was very popular among the Scholastics and is discussed extensively by rationalists like Descartes and Spinoza, and by empiricists like Locke, Berkeley, and Hume. It plays a large role in Schopenhauer's prize essay On the Freedom of the Will.
The metaphor of a balance is popular among philosophers whose model for mental actions is the resolution of forces like motives or desires. Is the will paralyzed when presented with identical choices? Of course there is no such thing as perfectly identical alternatives, but from ancient times philosophers argued this case, starting with Aristotle.
"there is this necessity of indifference...of the man who, though exceedingly hungry and thirsty, and both equally, yet being equidistant from food and drink, is therefore bound to stay where he is." (De Caelo, Book II, Sect.13, 295b31-33Aristotle assumed it was obvious that the man would not starve. He used this argument as a sort of reductio ad absurdum. But later Scholastics took this argument very seriously, especially the logician Jean Buridan with his example of an ass placed equidistant between two identical bales of hay. Buridan used it to show a critical difference between man and animals. The Scholastics claimed the ass would starve to death (which is nonsense), but a human in similar circumstances, with a god-given gift of free will (in this case the liberty of indifference) would deliberate and choose despite the perfect balance* between identical alternatives. Liberty of Indifference was often contrasted with Liberty of Spontaneity, another name for the "negative freedom" when one is free from constraints. Liberty of Spontaneity was also called Voluntarism. For classical compatibilists like Hume, Voluntarism or Liberty of Spontaneity is compatible with determinism. Since the agent's will is in the causal chain of events, it is one of the causes and that is enough for compatibilist free will. Liberty of Indifference, by contrast, was considered a positive freedom, first, to choose to act or not to act, and in more sophisticated libertarian positions, to choose from alternative actions. Liberty of Indifference thus raises the question whether one could have done otherwise. For David Hume, any liberty at all depends entirely on chance. Hume mistakenly generalized from the Liberty of Indifference where a random choice is quite rational between identical alternatives. He says that liberty is absurd and unintelligible, because it denies causality and necessity: I believe we may assign the three following reasons for the prevalence of the doctrine of liberty, however absurd it may be in one sense, and unintelligible in any other. First, After we have perform'd any action; tho' we confess we were influenc'd by particular views and motives; 'tis difficult for us to persuade ourselves we were govern'd by necessity, and that 'twas utterly impossible for us to have acted otherwise; the idea of necessity seeming to imply something of force, and violence, and constraint, of which we are not sensible. Few are capable of distinguishing betwixt the liberty of spontaneity, as it is call'd in the schools, and the liberty of indifference; betwixt that which is oppos'd to violence, and that which means a negation of necessity and causes.For Hume, liberty eliminates causality and necessity. The first compatibilist, Chrysippus, had settled for fate and determinism, while denying necessity. He agreed with Aristotle that necessity and freedom were incompatible. The modern compatibilists, Hobbes and Hume, restored necessity to their compatibilism and began the trend among modern philosophers, especially those who favor Hume's naturalism, to call free will unintelligible. Arthur Schopenhauer's essay "On the Freedom of the Will" won the prize of the Royal Danish Academy of Sciences in 1839. His description of his predecessors' work (pp. 65-90) is extensive. Schopenhauer defined absolute freedom - the liberum arbitrium indifferentiae - as not being determined by prior events. "Under given external conditions, two diametrically opposed actions are possible." He found this completely unacceptable. If we do not accept the strict necessity of all that happens by means of a causal chain which connects all events without exception, but allow this chain to be broken in countless places by an absolute freedom, then all foreseeing of the future... becomes...absolutely impossible, and so inconceivable.The future is of course not foreseeable, but chance is the direct cause of action only in those cases where no clear preference exists, the original and sound idea of a liberty of indifference. In those cases flipping a coin is an appropriate rational action. For all other cases, chance simply contributes creative alternative possibilities for the determined will to choose from with a much broader liberty than the restricted cases of indifference. Robert Kane's dual rational control
Kane has developed the idea of dual rational control in the case of a “torn decision,” (in which an agent has equally powerful reasons for choosing either way between two alternatives) and yet preserve the sense of moral responsibility. As long as the agent is prepared to accept responsibility either way, flipping a coin does no harm to moral responsibility.
Kane distinguishes such choices from the ancient Liberty of Indifference in which there is no meaningful differences between choices, such as the classic idea of Buridan's Ass.
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