R. M. Hare
R. M. Hare was a moral philosopher, who thought "about moral questions by exposing the logical structure of the language in which this thought is expressed." He was an early member of the so-called "Ordinary Language School of Philosophy", which proposed to "dis-solve" the classical unanswered questions of philosophy by regarding them as "pseudo-problems" to be analyzed as linguistic problems. Hare succeeded J. L. Austin as White's Professor of Moral Philosophy at Oxford. He discusses issues of freedom in his earlier Freedom and Reason, and in later essays like "Prediction and Moral Appraisal" (originally Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 1978, repr. in his Essays on Bioethics, 1993). Hare writes of the necessity to simplify some of the basic tenets in the so-called "Free Will controversy", especially when looking for its application in practical policies. But Hare did not see that one of the great predecessors of analytic language philosophy had already dis-solved the "free will" problem as a confusion of language. John Locke pointed out in 1690 that the adjective "free" applies to the agent, not to the will, which is determined by the mind, and which determines the action.
I think the question is not proper, whether the will be free, but whether a man be free... This way of talking, nevertheless, has prevailed, and, as I guess, produced great confusion.To be fair, the problems of moral responsibility need to be separated from the problem of free will, and Hare knows that moral problems are real problems, not pseudo-problems.
"Determinism and Libertarianism are still thought by many to be locked in a conflict which philosophers have been unable to resolve, and it is also thought that the conflict is of great practical significance, so that for example, important policy decisions about the punishment of offenders or the education of children hang upon its solution. But in fact I do not think that many of those who have come down decisively on one of what they think are the two sides of the so-called 'Free Will controversy' have been caused thereby to alter their opinions on any important practical question -- or if they have, they have lacked reason. For as soon as we ask, what an extreme determinist or an extreme libertarian would have to say about practical issues as a result of embracing their doctrines, both are faced with the same dilemma. Either they say that the consequences of their views are something so utterly absurd as to cast doubt on the seriousness of anybody who maintains them; or they say that the consequences are no different from what the rest of us think -- in which case, they are left, in spite of their alleged dispute, in substantial agreement with one another and with the ordinary man. This is, in short, one of the class of puzzles which used to be called 'pseudo-problems' -- a very misleading expression, because if something is a problem for someone, it really is a problem for him and he needs to solve it. What the people who invented this term ought to have said is that there are different kinds of problems, of which some admit a 'yes'-or-'no' answer; others, such as this one, require instead a fuller understanding of the question itself, to see the pitfalls and ambiguities in it".
Hare extended Immanuel Kant's Categorical Imperative by insisting that all the words used in such imperatives must be universals. There should be no references to the individuals involved, no pronouns like you or I, us or they. Secondly, you must be prepared to act yourself on that imperative, no matter what position you are in. This resembles John Rawls' "veil of ignorance."