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Philosophers

Mortimer Adler
Rogers Albritton
Alexander of Aphrodisias
Samuel Alexander
William Alston
Anaximander
G.E.M.Anscombe
Anselm
Louise Antony
Thomas Aquinas
Aristotle
David Armstrong
Harald Atmanspacher
Robert Audi
Augustine
J.L.Austin
A.J.Ayer
Alexander Bain
Mark Balaguer
Jeffrey Barrett
William Belsham
Henri Bergson
George Berkeley
Isaiah Berlin
Richard J. Bernstein
Bernard Berofsky
Robert Bishop
Max Black
Susanne Bobzien
Emil du Bois-Reymond
Hilary Bok
Laurence BonJour
George Boole
Émile Boutroux
F.H.Bradley
C.D.Broad
Michael Burke
C.A.Campbell
Joseph Keim Campbell
Rudolf Carnap
Carneades
Ernst Cassirer
David Chalmers
Roderick Chisholm
Chrysippus
Cicero
Randolph Clarke
Samuel Clarke
Anthony Collins
Antonella Corradini
Diodorus Cronus
Jonathan Dancy
Donald Davidson
Mario De Caro
Democritus
Daniel Dennett
Jacques Derrida
René Descartes
Richard Double
Fred Dretske
John Dupré
John Earman
Laura Waddell Ekstrom
Epictetus
Epicurus
Herbert Feigl
John Martin Fischer
Owen Flanagan
Luciano Floridi
Philippa Foot
Alfred Fouilleé
Harry Frankfurt
Richard L. Franklin
Michael Frede
Gottlob Frege
Peter Geach
Edmund Gettier
Carl Ginet
Alvin Goldman
Gorgias
Nicholas St. John Green
H.Paul Grice
Ian Hacking
Ishtiyaque Haji
Stuart Hampshire
W.F.R.Hardie
Sam Harris
William Hasker
R.M.Hare
Georg W.F. Hegel
Martin Heidegger
Heraclitus
R.E.Hobart
Thomas Hobbes
David Hodgson
Shadsworth Hodgson
Baron d'Holbach
Ted Honderich
Pamela Huby
David Hume
Ferenc Huoranszki
William James
Lord Kames
Robert Kane
Immanuel Kant
Tomis Kapitan
Jaegwon Kim
William King
Hilary Kornblith
Christine Korsgaard
Saul Kripke
Andrea Lavazza
Keith Lehrer
Gottfried Leibniz
Leucippus
Michael Levin
George Henry Lewes
C.I.Lewis
David Lewis
Peter Lipton
C. Lloyd Morgan
John Locke
Michael Lockwood
E. Jonathan Lowe
John R. Lucas
Lucretius
Alasdair MacIntyre
Ruth Barcan Marcus
James Martineau
Storrs McCall
Hugh McCann
Colin McGinn
Michael McKenna
Brian McLaughlin
John McTaggart
Paul E. Meehl
Uwe Meixner
Alfred Mele
Trenton Merricks
John Stuart Mill
Dickinson Miller
G.E.Moore
Thomas Nagel
Friedrich Nietzsche
John Norton
P.H.Nowell-Smith
Robert Nozick
William of Ockham
Timothy O'Connor
Parmenides
David F. Pears
Charles Sanders Peirce
Derk Pereboom
Steven Pinker
Plato
Karl Popper
Porphyry
Huw Price
H.A.Prichard
Protagoras
Hilary Putnam
Willard van Orman Quine
Frank Ramsey
Ayn Rand
Michael Rea
Thomas Reid
Charles Renouvier
Nicholas Rescher
C.W.Rietdijk
Richard Rorty
Josiah Royce
Bertrand Russell
Paul Russell
Gilbert Ryle
Jean-Paul Sartre
Kenneth Sayre
T.M.Scanlon
Moritz Schlick
Arthur Schopenhauer
John Searle
Wilfrid Sellars
Alan Sidelle
Ted Sider
Henry Sidgwick
Walter Sinnott-Armstrong
J.J.C.Smart
Saul Smilansky
Michael Smith
Baruch Spinoza
L. Susan Stebbing
Isabelle Stengers
George F. Stout
Galen Strawson
Peter Strawson
Eleonore Stump
Francisco Suárez
Richard Taylor
Kevin Timpe
Mark Twain
Peter Unger
Peter van Inwagen
Manuel Vargas
John Venn
Kadri Vihvelin
Voltaire
G.H. von Wright
David Foster Wallace
R. Jay Wallace
W.G.Ward
Ted Warfield
Roy Weatherford
William Whewell
Alfred North Whitehead
David Widerker
David Wiggins
Bernard Williams
Timothy Williamson
Ludwig Wittgenstein
Susan Wolf

Scientists

Michael Arbib
Bernard Baars
Gregory Bateson
John S. Bell
Charles Bennett
Ludwig von Bertalanffy
Susan Blackmore
Margaret Boden
David Bohm
Niels Bohr
Ludwig Boltzmann
Emile Borel
Max Born
Satyendra Nath Bose
Walther Bothe
Hans Briegel
Leon Brillouin
Stephen Brush
Henry Thomas Buckle
S. H. Burbury
Donald Campbell
Anthony Cashmore
Eric Chaisson
Jean-Pierre Changeux
Arthur Holly Compton
John Conway
John Cramer
E. P. Culverwell
Charles Darwin
Terrence Deacon
Louis de Broglie
Max Delbrück
Abraham de Moivre
Paul Dirac
Hans Driesch
John Eccles
Arthur Stanley Eddington
Paul Ehrenfest
Albert Einstein
Hugh Everett, III
Franz Exner
Richard Feynman
R. A. Fisher
Joseph Fourier
Lila Gatlin
Michael Gazzaniga
GianCarlo Ghirardi
J. Willard Gibbs
Nicolas Gisin
Paul Glimcher
Thomas Gold
A.O.Gomes
Brian Goodwin
Joshua Greene
Jacques Hadamard
Patrick Haggard
Stuart Hameroff
Augustin Hamon
Sam Harris
Hyman Hartman
John-Dylan Haynes
Martin Heisenberg
Werner Heisenberg
John Herschel
Jesper Hoffmeyer
E. T. Jaynes
William Stanley Jevons
Roman Jakobson
Pascual Jordan
Ruth E. Kastner
Stuart Kauffman
Simon Kochen
Stephen Kosslyn
Ladislav Kovàč
Rolf Landauer
Alfred Landé
Pierre-Simon Laplace
David Layzer
Benjamin Libet
Seth Lloyd
Hendrik Lorentz
Josef Loschmidt
Ernst Mach
Donald MacKay
Henry Margenau
James Clerk Maxwell
Ernst Mayr
Ulrich Mohrhoff
Jacques Monod
Emmy Noether
Howard Pattee
Wolfgang Pauli
Massimo Pauri
Roger Penrose
Steven Pinker
Colin Pittendrigh
Max Planck
Susan Pockett
Henri Poincaré
Daniel Pollen
Ilya Prigogine
Hans Primas
Adolphe Quételet
Juan Roederer
Jerome Rothstein
David Ruelle
Erwin Schrödinger
Aaron Schurger
Claude Shannon
David Shiang
Herbert Simon
Dean Keith Simonton
B. F. Skinner
Roger Sperry
Henry Stapp
Tom Stonier
Antoine Suarez
Leo Szilard
William Thomson (Kelvin)
Peter Tse
Heinz von Foerster
John von Neumann
John B. Watson
Daniel Wegner
Steven Weinberg
Paul A. Weiss
John Wheeler
Wilhelm Wien
Norbert Wiener
Eugene Wigner
E. O. Wilson
H. Dieter Zeh
Ernst Zermelo
Wojciech Zurek

Presentations

Biosemiotics
Free Will
Mental Causation
James Symposium
 
Philosophers

Mortimer Adler
Rogers Albritton
G.E.M.Anscombe
Anselm
Thomas Aquinas
Aristotle
Augustine
J.L.Austin
A.J.Ayer
Alexander Bain
Mark Balaguer
William Belsham
Henri Bergson
Isaiah Berlin
Bernard Berofsky
Susanne Bobzien
George Boole
Émile Boutroux
F.H.Bradley
C.D.Broad
C.A.Campbell
Joseph Keim Campbell
Carneades
Ernst Cassirer
David Chalmers
Roderick Chisholm
Chrysippus
Cicero
Randolph Clarke
Samuel Clarke
Anthony Collins
Diodorus Cronus
Donald Davidson
Mario De Caro
Democritus
Daniel Dennett
René Descartes
Richard Double
Emil du Bois-Reymond
Fred Dretske
John Earman
Laura Waddell Ekstrom
Epictetus
Epicurus
John Martin Fischer
Owen Flanagan
Luciano Floridi
Philippa Foot
Alfred Fouillée
Harry Frankfurt
Richard L. Franklin
Michael Frede
Carl Ginet
H.Paul Grice
Nicholas St. John Green
Ian Hacking
Ishtiyaque Haji
Stuart Hampshire
W.F.R.Hardie
R.M.Hare
Georg W.F. Hegel
Martin Heidegger
R.E.Hobart
Thomas Hobbes
David Hodgson
Shadsworth Hodgson
Ted Honderich
Pamela Huby
David Hume
William James
Lord Kames
Robert Kane
Immanuel Kant
Tomis Kapitan
Jaegwon Kim
William King
Christine Korsgaard
Keith Lehrer
Gottfried Leibniz
Leucippus
Michael Levin
C.I.Lewis
David Lewis
Peter Lipton
John Locke
Michael Lockwood
John R. Lucas
Lucretius
James Martineau
Storrs McCall
Hugh McCann
Colin McGinn
Michael McKenna
Paul E. Meehl
Alfred Mele
John Stuart Mill
Dickinson Miller
G.E.Moore
Thomas Nagel
Friedrich Nietzsche
P.H.Nowell-Smith
Robert Nozick
William of Ockham
Timothy O'Connor
David F. Pears
Charles Sanders Peirce
Derk Pereboom
Steven Pinker
Karl Popper
H.A.Prichard
Hilary Putnam
Willard van Orman Quine
Frank Ramsey
Ayn Rand
Thomas Reid
Charles Renouvier
Nicholas Rescher
C.W.Rietdijk
Josiah Royce
Bertrand Russell
Paul Russell
Gilbert Ryle
T.M.Scanlon
Moritz Schlick
Arthur Schopenhauer
John Searle
Henry Sidgwick
Walter Sinnott-Armstrong
J.J.C.Smart
Saul Smilansky
Michael Smith
L. Susan Stebbing
George F. Stout
Galen Strawson
Peter Strawson
Eleonore Stump
Richard Taylor
Kevin Timpe
Peter van Inwagen
Manuel Vargas
John Venn
Kadri Vihvelin
Voltaire
G.H. von Wright
David Foster Wallace
R. Jay Wallace
W.G.Ward
Ted Warfield
Roy Weatherford
William Whewell
Alfred North Whitehead
David Widerker
David Wiggins
Bernard Williams
Ludwig Wittgenstein
Susan Wolf

Scientists
Michael McKenna
Michael McKenna is a compatibilist and naturalist who is a prominent defender of Harry Frankfurt's attempts to deny the principle of alternative possibilities (or PAP).

McKenna's recent attempts are notable in that they openly grant libertarian freedom involving alternative possibilities.

John Martin Fischer described any remaining alternative possibilities as miniscule "flickers of freedom" that are not morally significant.

McKenna argues that Frankfurt defenders should not struggle to block these many alternative possibilities that are not morally significant. They should grant indeterministic libertarian freedom to those and concentrate on blocking the morally significant.

McKenna extends Fischer's morally "robust" alternatives, saying that they must figure in the ground upon which an agent is morally responsible for her action.

McKenna hopes for a strategy that will not simply discount all the alternative possibilities, because that might appear to be determining the agent's action.

Can Frankfurt examples achieve both the results of polluting all robust alternatives and at the same time not presupposing determinism? The trouble seems to be that effectively polluting all alternative actional pathways within an agent's control comes dangerously close to making that problematic deterministic assumption. But loosening the restraints so as to avoid this problem seems to invite sufficient slippage that the incompatibilist will be able to locate some robust alternative.

I suggest that the Frankfurt-defender attempt to close off all morally significant alternatives without attempting to pollute all alternative actional pathways within an agent's control. To do this a Frankfurt-defender must identify some class of actional pathways comprising morally insignificant alternatives — alternatives that could not aid in grounding the judgment that an agent in a Frankfurt example is morally responsible for what she does. The Frankfurt defender can leave these actional pathways entirely open and within the control of the agent. No fancy gizmos or crafty interveners need to be present to achieve the modest ensuring conditions required simply to close down some, but not all, alternatives. It is easy to imagine contingencies entirely consistent with indeterminism in which some range of an agent's options are blocked. Call this the limited blockage strategy for defending Frankfurt examples.
(Robustness, Control, and Moral Alternatives, in Moral Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities, p.206)

With his "limited blockage strategy" McKenna can allow "oodles and oodles" of unimportant alternatives.

The theoretical advantage the limited blockage strategy offers over other recent Frankfurt example strategies is that limited blockage cases openly grant libertarian freedom involving alternative possibilities. The examples. therefore, clearly do not require any special considerations that might tacitly import a deterministic relation between agent and action. Indeed, they allow an agent in a Frankfurt example oodles and oodles of alternatives. lmagine in the case Brain Malfunction, the many further possibilities open to Casper.

Casper could have sung a little ditty and done a cutesy jig like Shirley Temple, finishing off with a set of jazz hands; or begun citing nursery rhymes; or made an attempt to eat his fist; or any of a number of equally ludicrous and irrelevant things.
(Robustness, Control, and Moral Alternatives, in Moral Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities, p.212-3)

For Teachers
For Scholars
Ooodles and Oodles of Alternatives
The buzz about the success of Frankfurt examples has centered around whether any such examples can succeed in eliminating all robust alternative possibilities while preserving the integrity of judgments of moral responsibility. According to the traditional incompatibilist, robust alternatives figure in the ground upon which it is judged that an agent is morally responsible for what she has done. I believe that one way in which Frankfurt defenders have been too generous with their adversaries is in the basis for granting an alternative the status of robustness. Recall the earlier explanation of the two conditions required for a robust alternative: (1) the alternative must be morally significant, and (2) it must be within the scope of the agent's control. By and large, Frankfurt defenders, especially those recently responding to the loci protection strategy, have assumed that any alternative within the scope of an agent's voluntary control is thereby morally significant and is, hence, sufficient for robustness. I believe that they have mistakenly fixed all of their attentions on the second condition for a robust alternative. This makes their task too hard. It requires that they construct complicated scenarios that rule out all alternative courses of action at, but not prior to, the locus of a freely willed action. By carefully restricting the range of morally significant alternatives to those that are deliberatively significant as well, the Frankfurt defender, via the limited blockage strategy, can exploit the first condition for a robust alternative, leaving the second condition well enough alone. In doing so, she can grant an agent control over a range of unpolluted actional pathways — oodles and oodles of them — while still denying that any of those alternatives could play a proper role in contributing to the ground on which an agent is deemed morally responsible. This allows the Frankfurt defender to avoid the compelling case made by those incompatibilists who defend the alternative possibilities at the loci of freely willed actions. Limited blockage Frankfurt examples prove that, properly articulated, morally significant alternative possibilities are not required for moral responsibility. This is what Frankfurt and the actual sequence compatibilist should be shooting for, and this is what the limited blockage strategy establishes. Determinism cannot rule out free will and moral responsibility by ruling out morally significant alternatives. Perhaps an incompatibilist can make the case that determinism rules them out by ruling our morally insignificant alternative possibilities. But that, dialectically, is a far less compelling defense of the incompatibilist position. The actual sequence compatibilist has won the battle over the alleged importance of alternative possibilities for free will and moral responsibility.
(Robustness, Control, and Moral Alternatives, in Moral Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities, p.213)

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