Philosophers
Mortimer Adler Rogers Albritton Alexander of Aphrodisias Samuel Alexander William Alston Anaximander G.E.M.Anscombe Anselm Louise Antony Thomas Aquinas Aristotle David Armstrong Harald Atmanspacher Robert Audi Augustine J.L.Austin A.J.Ayer Alexander Bain Mark Balaguer Jeffrey Barrett William Belsham Henri Bergson George Berkeley Isaiah Berlin Richard J. Bernstein Bernard Berofsky Robert Bishop Max Black Susanne Bobzien Emil du BoisReymond Hilary Bok Laurence BonJour George Boole Émile Boutroux F.H.Bradley C.D.Broad Michael Burke C.A.Campbell Joseph Keim Campbell Rudolf Carnap Carneades Ernst Cassirer David Chalmers Roderick Chisholm Chrysippus Cicero Randolph Clarke Samuel Clarke Anthony Collins Antonella Corradini Diodorus Cronus Jonathan Dancy Donald Davidson Mario De Caro Democritus Daniel Dennett Jacques Derrida René Descartes Richard Double Fred Dretske John Dupré John Earman Laura Waddell Ekstrom Epictetus Epicurus Herbert Feigl John Martin Fischer Owen Flanagan Luciano Floridi Philippa Foot Alfred Fouilleé Harry Frankfurt Richard L. Franklin Michael Frede Gottlob Frege Peter Geach Edmund Gettier Carl Ginet Alvin Goldman Gorgias Nicholas St. John Green H.Paul Grice Ian Hacking Ishtiyaque Haji Stuart Hampshire W.F.R.Hardie Sam Harris William Hasker R.M.Hare Georg W.F. Hegel Martin Heidegger Heraclitus R.E.Hobart Thomas Hobbes David Hodgson Shadsworth Hodgson Baron d'Holbach Ted Honderich Pamela Huby David Hume Ferenc Huoranszki William James Lord Kames Robert Kane Immanuel Kant Tomis Kapitan Jaegwon Kim William King Hilary Kornblith Christine Korsgaard Saul Kripke Andrea Lavazza Keith Lehrer Gottfried Leibniz Leucippus Michael Levin George Henry Lewes C.I.Lewis David Lewis Peter Lipton C. Lloyd Morgan John Locke Michael Lockwood E. Jonathan Lowe John R. Lucas Lucretius Alasdair MacIntyre Ruth Barcan Marcus James Martineau Storrs McCall Hugh McCann Colin McGinn Michael McKenna Brian McLaughlin John McTaggart Paul E. Meehl Uwe Meixner Alfred Mele Trenton Merricks John Stuart Mill Dickinson Miller G.E.Moore Thomas Nagel Friedrich Nietzsche John Norton P.H.NowellSmith Robert Nozick William of Ockham Timothy O'Connor Parmenides David F. Pears Charles Sanders Peirce Derk Pereboom Steven Pinker Plato Karl Popper Porphyry Huw Price H.A.Prichard Protagoras Hilary Putnam Willard van Orman Quine Frank Ramsey Ayn Rand Michael Rea Thomas Reid Charles Renouvier Nicholas Rescher C.W.Rietdijk Richard Rorty Josiah Royce Bertrand Russell Paul Russell Gilbert Ryle JeanPaul Sartre Kenneth Sayre T.M.Scanlon Moritz Schlick Arthur Schopenhauer John Searle Wilfrid Sellars Alan Sidelle Ted Sider Henry Sidgwick Walter SinnottArmstrong J.J.C.Smart Saul Smilansky Michael Smith Baruch Spinoza L. Susan Stebbing Isabelle Stengers George F. Stout Galen Strawson Peter Strawson Eleonore Stump Francisco Suárez Richard Taylor Kevin Timpe Mark Twain Peter Unger Peter van Inwagen Manuel Vargas John Venn Kadri Vihvelin Voltaire G.H. von Wright David Foster Wallace R. Jay Wallace W.G.Ward Ted Warfield Roy Weatherford William Whewell Alfred North Whitehead David Widerker David Wiggins Bernard Williams Timothy Williamson Ludwig Wittgenstein Susan Wolf Scientists Michael Arbib Bernard Baars Gregory Bateson John S. Bell Charles Bennett Ludwig von Bertalanffy Susan Blackmore Margaret Boden David Bohm Niels Bohr Ludwig Boltzmann Emile Borel Max Born Satyendra Nath Bose Walther Bothe Hans Briegel Leon Brillouin Stephen Brush Henry Thomas Buckle S. H. Burbury Donald Campbell Anthony Cashmore Eric Chaisson JeanPierre Changeux Arthur Holly Compton John Conway John Cramer E. P. Culverwell Charles Darwin Terrence Deacon Louis de Broglie Max Delbrück Abraham de Moivre Paul Dirac Hans Driesch John Eccles Arthur Stanley Eddington Paul Ehrenfest Albert Einstein Hugh Everett, III Franz Exner Richard Feynman R. A. Fisher Joseph Fourier Lila Gatlin Michael Gazzaniga GianCarlo Ghirardi J. Willard Gibbs Nicolas Gisin Paul Glimcher Thomas Gold A.O.Gomes Brian Goodwin Joshua Greene Jacques Hadamard Patrick Haggard Stuart Hameroff Augustin Hamon Sam Harris Hyman Hartman JohnDylan Haynes Martin Heisenberg Werner Heisenberg John Herschel Jesper Hoffmeyer E. T. Jaynes William Stanley Jevons Roman Jakobson Pascual Jordan Ruth E. Kastner Stuart Kauffman Simon Kochen Stephen Kosslyn Ladislav Kovàč Rolf Landauer Alfred Landé PierreSimon Laplace David Layzer Benjamin Libet Seth Lloyd Hendrik Lorentz Josef Loschmidt Ernst Mach Donald MacKay Henry Margenau James Clerk Maxwell Ernst Mayr Ulrich Mohrhoff Jacques Monod Emmy Noether Howard Pattee Wolfgang Pauli Massimo Pauri Roger Penrose Steven Pinker Colin Pittendrigh Max Planck Susan Pockett Henri Poincaré Daniel Pollen Ilya Prigogine Hans Primas Adolphe Quételet Juan Roederer Jerome Rothstein David Ruelle Erwin Schrödinger Aaron Schurger Claude Shannon David Shiang Herbert Simon Dean Keith Simonton B. F. Skinner Roger Sperry Henry Stapp Tom Stonier Antoine Suarez Leo Szilard William Thomson (Kelvin) Peter Tse Heinz von Foerster John von Neumann John B. Watson Daniel Wegner Steven Weinberg Paul A. Weiss John Wheeler Wilhelm Wien Norbert Wiener Eugene Wigner E. O. Wilson H. Dieter Zeh Ernst Zermelo Wojciech Zurek Presentations Biosemiotics Free Will Mental Causation James Symposium 
John Stewart Bell
In 1964 John Bell showed how the 1935 "thought experiments" of Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen (EPR) could be made into real experiments. He put limits on local "hidden variables" that might restore a deterministic physics in the form of what he called an "inequality," the violation of which would confirm standard quantum mechanics.
Some thinkers, mostly philosophers of science rather than working quantum physicists, think that Bell's work has restored the determinism in physics that Einstein had wanted and that Bell recovered the "local elements of reality" that Einstein hoped for. But Bell himself came to the conclusion that local "hidden variables" will never be found that give the same results as quantum mechanics. This has come to be known as Bell's Theorem. All theories that reproduce the predictions of quantum mechanics will be "nonlocal," Bell concluded. Nonlocality is an element of physical reality and it has produced some remarkable new applications of quantum physics, including quantum cryptography and quantum computing. Bell based his idea of real experiments on the 1952 work of David Bohm. Bohm proposed an improvement on the original EPR experiment (which measured position and momentum). Bohm's reformulation of quantum mechanics postulates (undetectable) deterministic positions and trajectories for atomic particles, where the instantaneous collapse happens in a new "quantum potential" field that can move faster than light speed. But it is still a "nonlocal" theory. So Bohm (and Bell) believed that nonlocal "hidden variables" might exist, and that some form of information could come into existence at remote "spacelike separations" at speeds faster then light, if not instantaneously. The original EPR paper was based on a question of Einstein's about two electrons fired in opposite directions from a central source with equal velocities. Einstein imagined them starting from a distance at t_{0} and approaching one another with high velocities, then for a short time interval from t_{1} to t_{1} + Δt in contact with one another, where experimental measurements could be made on the momenta, after which they separate. Now at a later time t_{2} it would be possible to make a measurement of electron 1's position and would therefore know the position of electron 2 without measuring it explicitly. Einstein used the conservation of linear momentum to "know" the symmetric position of the other electron. This knowledge implies information about the remote electron that is available instantly. Einstein called this "spooky actionatadistance." Bohm's 1952 thought experiment used two electrons that are prepared in an initial state of known total spin. If one electron spin is 1/2 in the up direction and the other is spin down or 1/2, the total spin is zero. The underlying physical law of importance is still a conservation law, in this case the conservation of angular momentum.
Since Bell's original work, many other physicists have defined other "Bell inequalities" and developed increasingly sophisticated experiments to test them. Most recent tests have used oppositely polarized photons coming from a central source. It is the total photon spin of zero that is conserved.
In his 1964 paper "On the EinsteinPodolskyRosen Paradox," Bell made the case for nonlocality. The paradox of Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen was advanced as a argument that quantum mechanics could not be a complete theory but should be supplemented by additional variables. These additional variables were to restore to the theory causality and locality. In this note that idea will be formulated mathematically and shown to be incompatible with the statistical predictions of quantum mechanics. It is the requirement of locality, or more precisely that the result of a measurement on one system be unaffected by operations on a distant system with which it has interacted in the past, that creates the essential difficulty. There have been attempts to show that even without such a separability or locality requirement no 'hidden variable' interpretation of quantum mechanics is possible. These attempts have been examined [by Bell] elsewhere and found wanting. Moreover, a hidden variable interpretation of elementary quantum theory has been explicitly constructed [by Bohm]. That particular interpretation has indeed a gross nonlocal structure. This is characteristic, according to the result to be proved here, of any such theory which reproduces exactly the quantum mechanical predictions.
Superdeterminism
During a mid1980's interview by BBC Radio 3 organized by P. C. W. Davies and J. R. Brown, Bell proposed the idea of a "superdeterminism" that could explain the correlation of results in twoparticle experiments without the need for fasterthanlight signaling. The two experiments need only have been predetermined by causes reaching both experiments from an earlier time.
I was going to ask whether it is still possible to maintain, in the light of experimental experience, the idea of a deterministic universe? Bell's superdeterminism would deny the important "free choice" of the experimenter (originally suggested by Niels Bohr and Werner Heisenberg) and later explored by John Conway and Simon Kochen. Conway and Kochen claim that the experimenters' free choice requires that atoms must have free will, something they call their Free Will Theorem. Following John Bell's idea, Nicholas Gisin and Antoine Suarez argue that something might be coming from "outside space and time" to correlate results in their own experimental tests of Bell's Theorem. Roger Penrose and Stuart Hameroff have proposed causes coming "backward in time" to achieve the perfect EPR correlations, as has philosopher Huw Price.
A Preferred Frame?
A little later in the same BBC interview, Bell suggested that a preferred frame of reference might help to explain nonlocality and entanglement. [Davies] Bell's inequality is, as I understand it, rooted in two assumptions: the first is what we might call objective reality  the reality of the external world, independent of our observations; the second is locality, or nonseparability, or no fasterthanlight signalling. Now, Aspect's experiment appears to indicate that one of these two has to go. Which of the two would you like to hang on to? The standard explanation of entangled particles usually begins with an observer A, often called Alice, and a distant observer B, known as Bob. Between them is a source of two entangled particles. The twoparticle wave function describing the indistinguishable particles cannot be separated into a product of two singleparticle wave functions. The problem of fasterthanlight signaling arises when Alice is said to measure particle A and then puzzle over how Bob's (later) measurements of particle B can be perfectly correlated, when there is not enough time for any "influence" to travel from A to B. Now as John Bell knew very well, there are frames of reference moving with respect to the laboratory frame of the two observers in which the time order of the events can be reversed. In some moving frames Alice measures first, but in others Bob measures first. Back in the 1960's, C. W. Rietdijk and Hilary Putnam argued that physical determinism could be proved to be true by considering the experiments and observers A and B in a "spacelike" separation and moving at high speed with respect to one another. Roger Penrose developed a similar argument in his book The Emperor's New Mind. It is called the Andromeda Paradox. If there is a preferred frame of reference, surely it is the one in which the origin of the two entangled particles is at rest. Assuming that Alice and Bob are also at rest in this preferred frame and equidistant from the origin, we arrive at the simple picture in which any measurement that causes the twoparticle wave function to collapse makes both particles appear simultaneously at determinate places (just what is needed to conserve energy, momentum, angular momentum, and spin).
The EPR "paradox" is the result of a naive nonrelativistic description of events. Although the two events (measurements of particles A and B) are simultaneous in our preferred frame, the spacelike separation of the events means that from Alice's point of view, any knowledge of event B is out in her future. Bob likewise sees Alice's event A out in his future. These both cannot be true. Yet they are both true (and in some sense neither is true). Thus the paradox. Instead of just one particle making an appearance in the collapse of a singleparticle wave function, in the twoparticle case, when either particle is measured, we know instantly those properties of the other particle that satisfy the conservation laws, including its location equidistant from, but on the opposite side of, the source, and its other properties such as spin. Let's look at an animation of the twoparticle wave function expanding from the origin and what happens when, say, Alice makes a measurement.
You can compare the collapse of the twoparticle probability amplitude above to the singleparticle collapse here. We can also ask what happens if Bob is not at the same distance from the origin as Alice. When Alice detects the particle (with say spin up), at that instant the other particle also becomes determinate (with spin down) at the same distance on the other side of the origin. It now continues, in that determinate state, to Bob's measuring apparatus.
Recall Bell's description of the process (quoted above), with its mistaken bias toward assuming first one measurement is made, and the other measurement is made later. If measurement of the component σ_{1} • a, where a is some unit vector, yields the value + 1 then, according to quantum mechanics, measurement of σ_{2} • a must yield the value — 1 and vice versa... Since we can predict in advance the result of measuring any chosen component of σ_{2}, by previously measuring the same component of σ_{1}, it follows that the result of any such measurement must actually be predetermined.Since the collapse of the twoparticle wave function is indeterminate, nothing is predetermined, although σ_{2} is indeed determined once σ_{1} is measured.
In 1987, Bell contributed an article to a centenary volume for Erwin Schrödinger entitled Just a year before Bell's death in 1990, physicists assembled for a conference on 62 Years of Uncertainty (referring to Werner Heisenberg's 1927 principle of indeterminacy).
John Bell's contribution to the conference was an article called "Against Measurement." In it he attacked Max Born's statistical interpretation of quantum mechanics. And he praised the new ideas of GianCarlo Ghirardi and his colleagues, Alberto Rimini and Tomaso Weber: In the beginning, Schrödinger tried to interpret his wavefunction as giving somehow the density of the stuff of which the world is made. He tried to think of an electron as represented by a wavepacket — a wavefunction appreciably different from zero only over a small region in space. The extension of that region he thought of as the actual size of the electron — his electron was a bit fuzzy. At first he thought that small wavepackets, evolving according to the Schrödinger equation, would remain small. But that was wrong. Wavepackets diffuse, and with the passage of time become indefinitely extended, according to the Schrödinger equation. But however far the wavefunction has extended, the reaction of a detector to an electron remains spotty. So Schrödinger's 'realistic' interpretation of his wavefunction did not survive. On the 22nd of January 1990, Bell gave a talk explaining his theorem at CERN in Geneva organized by Antoine Suarez, director of the Center for Quantum Philosophy.
There are links on the CERN website to the
In this talk, Bell summarizes the situation as follows: It just is a fact that quantum mechanical predictions and experiments, in so far as they have been done, do not agree with [my] inequality. And that's just a brutal fact of nature...that's just the fact of the situation; the Einstein program fails, that's too bad for Einstein, but should we worry about that?Bell gives three reasons for not worrying.
So as a solution of this situation, I think we cannot just say 'Oh oh, nature is not like that.' I think you must find a picture in which perfect correlations are natural, without implying determinism, because that leads you back to nonlocality. And also in this independence as far as our individual experiences goes, our independence of the rest of the world is also natural. So the connections have to be very subtle, and I have told you all that I know about them. Thank you. The work of GianCarlo Ghirardi that Bell endorsed is a scheme that makes the wave function collapse by adding small (order of 10^{24}) nonlinear and stochastic terms to the linear Schrödinger equation. GRW can not predict when and where their collapse occurs (it is simply random), but the contact with macroscopic objects such as a measuring apparatus (with the order of 10^{24} atoms) makes the probability of collapse of order unity. Information physics removes Bell's "shifty split" without "hidden variables" or making ad hoc nonlinear additions like those of GhirardiRiminiWeber to the linear Schrödinger equation. The "moment" at which the boundary between quantum and classical worlds occurs is the moment that irreversible observable information enters the universe. So we can now look at John Bell's diagram of possible locations for his "shifty split" and identify the correct moment  when irreversible information enters the universe.
In the information physics solution to the problem of measurement, the timing and location of Bell's "shifty split" (the "cut" or "Schnitt" of Heisenberg and von Neumann) are identified with the interaction between quantum system and classical apparatus that leaves the apparatus in an irreversible stable state providing information to the observer. As Bell may have seen, it is therefore not a "measurement" by a conscious observer that is needed to "collapse" wave functions. It is the irreversible interaction of the quantum system with another system, whether quantum or approximately classical. The interaction must be one that changes the information about the system. And that means a local entropy decrease and overall entropy increase to make the information stable enough to be observed by an experimenter and therefore be a measurement. References
Against Measurement (PDF)
On the EinsteinPodolskyRosen Paradox (PDF) Are There Quantum Jumps? (PDF, Excerpt) BBC Interview (PDF, Excerpt) For Teachers
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