Philosophers
Mortimer Adler Rogers Albritton Alexander of Aphrodisias Samuel Alexander William Alston Anaximander G.E.M.Anscombe Anselm Louise Antony Thomas Aquinas Aristotle David Armstrong Harald Atmanspacher Robert Audi Augustine J.L.Austin A.J.Ayer Alexander Bain Mark Balaguer Jeffrey Barrett William Barrett William Belsham Henri Bergson George Berkeley Isaiah Berlin Richard J. Bernstein Bernard Berofsky Robert Bishop Max Black Susanne Bobzien Emil du Bois-Reymond Hilary Bok Laurence BonJour George Boole Émile Boutroux Daniel Boyd F.H.Bradley C.D.Broad Michael Burke Lawrence Cahoone C.A.Campbell Joseph Keim Campbell Rudolf Carnap Carneades Nancy Cartwright Gregg Caruso Ernst Cassirer David Chalmers Roderick Chisholm Chrysippus Cicero Tom Clark Randolph Clarke Samuel Clarke Anthony Collins Antonella Corradini Diodorus Cronus Jonathan Dancy Donald Davidson Mario De Caro Democritus Daniel Dennett Jacques Derrida René Descartes Richard Double Fred Dretske John Dupré John Earman Laura Waddell Ekstrom Epictetus Epicurus Austin Farrer Herbert Feigl Arthur Fine John Martin Fischer Frederic Fitch Owen Flanagan Luciano Floridi Philippa Foot Alfred Fouilleé Harry Frankfurt Richard L. Franklin Bas van Fraassen Michael Frede Gottlob Frege Peter Geach Edmund Gettier Carl Ginet Alvin Goldman Gorgias Nicholas St. John Green H.Paul Grice Ian Hacking Ishtiyaque Haji Stuart Hampshire W.F.R.Hardie Sam Harris William Hasker R.M.Hare Georg W.F. Hegel Martin Heidegger Heraclitus R.E.Hobart Thomas Hobbes David Hodgson Shadsworth Hodgson Baron d'Holbach Ted Honderich Pamela Huby David Hume Ferenc Huoranszki Frank Jackson William James Lord Kames Robert Kane Immanuel Kant Tomis Kapitan Walter Kaufmann Jaegwon Kim William King Hilary Kornblith Christine Korsgaard Saul Kripke Thomas Kuhn Andrea Lavazza Christoph Lehner Keith Lehrer Gottfried Leibniz Jules Lequyer Leucippus Michael Levin Joseph Levine George Henry Lewes C.I.Lewis David Lewis Peter Lipton C. Lloyd Morgan John Locke Michael Lockwood Arthur O. Lovejoy E. Jonathan Lowe John R. Lucas Lucretius Alasdair MacIntyre Ruth Barcan Marcus Tim Maudlin James Martineau Nicholas Maxwell Storrs McCall Hugh McCann Colin McGinn Michael McKenna Brian McLaughlin John McTaggart Paul E. Meehl Uwe Meixner Alfred Mele Trenton Merricks John Stuart Mill Dickinson Miller G.E.Moore Thomas Nagel Otto Neurath Friedrich Nietzsche John Norton P.H.Nowell-Smith Robert Nozick William of Ockham Timothy O'Connor Parmenides David F. Pears Charles Sanders Peirce Derk Pereboom Steven Pinker U.T.Place Plato Karl Popper Porphyry Huw Price H.A.Prichard Protagoras Hilary Putnam Willard van Orman Quine Frank Ramsey Ayn Rand Michael Rea Thomas Reid Charles Renouvier Nicholas Rescher C.W.Rietdijk Richard Rorty Josiah Royce Bertrand Russell Paul Russell Gilbert Ryle Jean-Paul Sartre Kenneth Sayre T.M.Scanlon Moritz Schlick John Duns Scotus Arthur Schopenhauer John Searle Wilfrid Sellars David Shiang Alan Sidelle Ted Sider Henry Sidgwick Walter Sinnott-Armstrong Peter Slezak J.J.C.Smart Saul Smilansky Michael Smith Baruch Spinoza L. Susan Stebbing Isabelle Stengers George F. Stout Galen Strawson Peter Strawson Eleonore Stump Francisco Suárez Richard Taylor Kevin Timpe Mark Twain Peter Unger Peter van Inwagen Manuel Vargas John Venn Kadri Vihvelin Voltaire G.H. von Wright David Foster Wallace R. Jay Wallace W.G.Ward Ted Warfield Roy Weatherford C.F. von Weizsäcker William Whewell Alfred North Whitehead David Widerker David Wiggins Bernard Williams Timothy Williamson Ludwig Wittgenstein Susan Wolf Scientists David Albert Michael Arbib Walter Baade Bernard Baars Jeffrey Bada Leslie Ballentine Marcello Barbieri Gregory Bateson Horace Barlow John S. Bell Mara Beller Charles Bennett Ludwig von Bertalanffy Susan Blackmore Margaret Boden David Bohm Niels Bohr Ludwig Boltzmann Emile Borel Max Born Satyendra Nath Bose Walther Bothe Jean Bricmont Hans Briegel Leon Brillouin Stephen Brush Henry Thomas Buckle S. H. Burbury Melvin Calvin Donald Campbell Sadi Carnot Anthony Cashmore Eric Chaisson Gregory Chaitin Jean-Pierre Changeux Rudolf Clausius Arthur Holly Compton John Conway Jerry Coyne John Cramer Francis Crick E. P. Culverwell Antonio Damasio Olivier Darrigol Charles Darwin Richard Dawkins Terrence Deacon Lüder Deecke Richard Dedekind Louis de Broglie Stanislas Dehaene Max Delbrück Abraham de Moivre Bernard d'Espagnat Paul Dirac Hans Driesch John Eccles Arthur Stanley Eddington Gerald Edelman Paul Ehrenfest Manfred Eigen Albert Einstein George F. R. Ellis Hugh Everett, III Franz Exner Richard Feynman R. A. Fisher David Foster Joseph Fourier Philipp Frank Steven Frautschi Edward Fredkin Augustin-Jean Fresnel Benjamin Gal-Or Howard Gardner Lila Gatlin Michael Gazzaniga Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen GianCarlo Ghirardi J. Willard Gibbs James J. Gibson Nicolas Gisin Paul Glimcher Thomas Gold A. O. Gomes Brian Goodwin Joshua Greene Dirk ter Haar Jacques Hadamard Mark Hadley Patrick Haggard J. B. S. Haldane Stuart Hameroff Augustin Hamon Sam Harris Ralph Hartley Hyman Hartman Jeff Hawkins John-Dylan Haynes Donald Hebb Martin Heisenberg Werner Heisenberg John Herschel Basil Hiley Art Hobson Jesper Hoffmeyer Don Howard John H. Jackson William Stanley Jevons Roman Jakobson E. T. Jaynes Pascual Jordan Eric Kandel Ruth E. Kastner Stuart Kauffman Martin J. Klein William R. Klemm Christof Koch Simon Kochen Hans Kornhuber Stephen Kosslyn Daniel Koshland Ladislav Kovàč Leopold Kronecker Rolf Landauer Alfred Landé Pierre-Simon Laplace Karl Lashley David Layzer Joseph LeDoux Gerald Lettvin Gilbert Lewis Benjamin Libet David Lindley Seth Lloyd Werner Loewenstein Hendrik Lorentz Josef Loschmidt Alfred Lotka Ernst Mach Donald MacKay Henry Margenau Owen Maroney David Marr Humberto Maturana James Clerk Maxwell Ernst Mayr John McCarthy Warren McCulloch N. David Mermin George Miller Stanley Miller Ulrich Mohrhoff Jacques Monod Vernon Mountcastle Emmy Noether Donald Norman Alexander Oparin Abraham Pais Howard Pattee Wolfgang Pauli Massimo Pauri Wilder Penfield Roger Penrose Steven Pinker Colin Pittendrigh Walter Pitts Max Planck Susan Pockett Henri Poincaré Daniel Pollen Ilya Prigogine Hans Primas Zenon Pylyshyn Henry Quastler Adolphe Quételet Pasco Rakic Nicolas Rashevsky Lord Rayleigh Frederick Reif Jürgen Renn Giacomo Rizzolati A.A. Roback Emil Roduner Juan Roederer Jerome Rothstein David Ruelle David Rumelhart Robert Sapolsky Tilman Sauer Ferdinand de Saussure Jürgen Schmidhuber Erwin Schrödinger Aaron Schurger Sebastian Seung Thomas Sebeok Franco Selleri Claude Shannon Charles Sherrington Abner Shimony Herbert Simon Dean Keith Simonton Edmund Sinnott B. F. Skinner Lee Smolin Ray Solomonoff Roger Sperry John Stachel Henry Stapp Tom Stonier Antoine Suarez Leo Szilard Max Tegmark Teilhard de Chardin Libb Thims William Thomson (Kelvin) Richard Tolman Giulio Tononi Peter Tse Alan Turing C. S. Unnikrishnan Francisco Varela Vlatko Vedral Vladimir Vernadsky Mikhail Volkenstein Heinz von Foerster Richard von Mises John von Neumann Jakob von Uexküll C. H. Waddington John B. Watson Daniel Wegner Steven Weinberg Paul A. Weiss Herman Weyl John Wheeler Jeffrey Wicken Wilhelm Wien Norbert Wiener Eugene Wigner E. O. Wilson Günther Witzany Stephen Wolfram H. Dieter Zeh Semir Zeki Ernst Zermelo Wojciech Zurek Konrad Zuse Fritz Zwicky Presentations Biosemiotics Free Will Mental Causation James Symposium |
John Bell Inequality Video (Partial) Transcription of Bell Video
It just is a fact that quantum mechanical predictions and experiments, in so far as they
have been done, do not agree with [my] inequality. And that's just a brutal fact of nature.
The genetic hypothesis, which seems absolutely compelling for parallel devices, simply
doesn't work for nonparallel devices. You can't get away with the genetic hypothesis, and
therefore the Einsteinian argument fails. No action at a distance led you to determinism,
in the case of parallel polarisers, but determinism, in the case of off parallel polarisers,
leads you back to action at a distance:
What Bell Writes on the Blackboard
Now, in my opinion, in answer to the question that you posed at the beginning, I don't
know this phrase is too strong and active an assertion, I cannot say that action at a
distance is required in physics. But I can say that you cannot get away with no action at a
distance. You cannot separate off what happens in one place and what happens in
another. Somehow they have to be described and explained jointly. Well, that's just the
fact of the situation; the Einstein program fails, that's too bad for Einstein, but should we
worry about that? So what?
Now, there are three replies to the question “So what?” One is that the whole idea of
action at a distance is very repugnant to physicists. If I were speaking for an hour..., I
would bombard you with quotations from Newton, and Einstein, and Bohr, and all the
other great men, telling you how unthinkable it is that by doing something here, we can
change the situation in a removed place. I think that the founding fathers of quantum
mechanics did not so much need Einstein's arguments about the desirability of no action
at a distance, as they looked away. The whole idea that, either there might be
determinism, or action at a distance, was so repugnant to them that they looked away.
Well that's tradition, and we have to learn in life sometimes to learn new traditions. And
it might be that we have to learn to accept not so much action at a distance, but
inadequacy of no action at a distance.
There are two more professional reasons for being discontented with the situation.
Now one is relativity. According to relativity, the notion of simultaneity is relative. And
events which are simultaneous for one observer are not simultaneous for another. So it
does not make sense for very distant situations, to say that one event has occurred before
or after another. So if we allow the result at one of these experimental set-ups to depend
on what an experimenter does at the other, we have a puzzle, because we would not like
what he does here to have an effect there, before it is done here. But if I say that this is
affecting that, I can find some observer for whom this comes after that. So if I set up a
traditional causal model, which the cause effects are allowed to be nonlocal, in the sense
of propagating instantaneously over large distances, in some frame of reference the cause
will come before the effect. So we have to be a bit more subtle than that somehow. I have
to find some way out of this situation, which allows something somehow to go from one
place to another, very quickly, but without being in conflict with special relativity. And
that has not been done. We have the statistical predictions of quantum mechanics, and
they seem to be right. The correlations seem to cry out for an explanation, and we don't
have one.
The other reason is no signals. It is a fact that I cannot use whatever this nonlocal
connection is to send signals. When you look at what quantum mechanics predicts, it
predicts so long as you look at just one side or other of this experiment, you will simply
have no information about what is happening in the other place. No matter what that
other fellow does with his equipment, you will not notice anything funny happening in
your side. As an analogy of that, I could say, supposing we were tossing coins, I here and
one of you people down here. And supposing I had the power to say that your coin will
turn an extra time before it falls on the table. Now you are looking at your coins and you
see heads tails heads tails. And you don't know when I have exercised my power to turn it
once more, because you didn't know whether it was going to fall heads or tails. So we
have the curious situation, that to explain the correlations between my results and yours,
we have to invoke some such mysterious power. But it is one which I absolutely cannot
use to send you a message. I got here a demonstration of that. This is a computer
simulation of such an experiment in which people are calling heads and tails. And when
it comes up heads I have written 'H', and for tails I have written blank, so that you can
see it from where you're sitting. And they're a whole series of random heads and tails,
you can see it there (Fig 2).
Fig. 2. Result of computer simulation of a random series of heads ‘H’ and tails (blank) Fig. 3. Inverted display of Fig.2: heads (blank), tails ‘H’. In some places the random code is changed. Fig. 4. Superposed images of Figs. 2 and 3 (after B. Julesz) Doctor Bell says we’re connected, Conclusion
And that is the dilemma. We are led by analysing this situation to admit that in
somehow distant things are connected, or at least not disconnected. And yet we do not
feel that we are connected. So as a solution of this situation, I think we cannot just say
'Oh oh, nature is not like that.' I think you must find a picture in which perfect
correlations are natural, without implying determinism, because that leads you back to
nonlocality. And also in this independence as far as our individual experiences goes, our
independence of the rest of the world is also natural. So the connections have to be very
subtle, and I have told you all that I know about them. Thank you.
Normal | Teacher | Scholar
|