Citation for this page in APA citation style.           Close


Mortimer Adler
Rogers Albritton
Alexander of Aphrodisias
Samuel Alexander
William Alston
Louise Antony
Thomas Aquinas
David Armstrong
Harald Atmanspacher
Robert Audi
Alexander Bain
Mark Balaguer
Jeffrey Barrett
William Belsham
Henri Bergson
George Berkeley
Isaiah Berlin
Richard J. Bernstein
Bernard Berofsky
Robert Bishop
Max Black
Susanne Bobzien
Emil du Bois-Reymond
Hilary Bok
Laurence BonJour
George Boole
Émile Boutroux
Michael Burke
Joseph Keim Campbell
Rudolf Carnap
Ernst Cassirer
David Chalmers
Roderick Chisholm
Randolph Clarke
Samuel Clarke
Anthony Collins
Antonella Corradini
Diodorus Cronus
Jonathan Dancy
Donald Davidson
Mario De Caro
Daniel Dennett
Jacques Derrida
René Descartes
Richard Double
Fred Dretske
John Dupré
John Earman
Laura Waddell Ekstrom
Herbert Feigl
John Martin Fischer
Owen Flanagan
Luciano Floridi
Philippa Foot
Alfred Fouilleé
Harry Frankfurt
Richard L. Franklin
Michael Frede
Gottlob Frege
Peter Geach
Edmund Gettier
Carl Ginet
Alvin Goldman
Nicholas St. John Green
H.Paul Grice
Ian Hacking
Ishtiyaque Haji
Stuart Hampshire
Sam Harris
William Hasker
Georg W.F. Hegel
Martin Heidegger
Thomas Hobbes
David Hodgson
Shadsworth Hodgson
Baron d'Holbach
Ted Honderich
Pamela Huby
David Hume
Ferenc Huoranszki
William James
Lord Kames
Robert Kane
Immanuel Kant
Tomis Kapitan
Jaegwon Kim
William King
Hilary Kornblith
Christine Korsgaard
Saul Kripke
Andrea Lavazza
Keith Lehrer
Gottfried Leibniz
Jules Lequyer
Michael Levin
George Henry Lewes
David Lewis
Peter Lipton
C. Lloyd Morgan
John Locke
Michael Lockwood
E. Jonathan Lowe
John R. Lucas
Alasdair MacIntyre
Ruth Barcan Marcus
James Martineau
Storrs McCall
Hugh McCann
Colin McGinn
Michael McKenna
Brian McLaughlin
John McTaggart
Paul E. Meehl
Uwe Meixner
Alfred Mele
Trenton Merricks
John Stuart Mill
Dickinson Miller
Thomas Nagel
Otto Neurath
Friedrich Nietzsche
John Norton
Robert Nozick
William of Ockham
Timothy O'Connor
David F. Pears
Charles Sanders Peirce
Derk Pereboom
Steven Pinker
Karl Popper
Huw Price
Hilary Putnam
Willard van Orman Quine
Frank Ramsey
Ayn Rand
Michael Rea
Thomas Reid
Charles Renouvier
Nicholas Rescher
Richard Rorty
Josiah Royce
Bertrand Russell
Paul Russell
Gilbert Ryle
Jean-Paul Sartre
Kenneth Sayre
Moritz Schlick
Arthur Schopenhauer
John Searle
Wilfrid Sellars
Alan Sidelle
Ted Sider
Henry Sidgwick
Walter Sinnott-Armstrong
Saul Smilansky
Michael Smith
Baruch Spinoza
L. Susan Stebbing
Isabelle Stengers
George F. Stout
Galen Strawson
Peter Strawson
Eleonore Stump
Francisco Suárez
Richard Taylor
Kevin Timpe
Mark Twain
Peter Unger
Peter van Inwagen
Manuel Vargas
John Venn
Kadri Vihvelin
G.H. von Wright
David Foster Wallace
R. Jay Wallace
Ted Warfield
Roy Weatherford
William Whewell
Alfred North Whitehead
David Widerker
David Wiggins
Bernard Williams
Timothy Williamson
Ludwig Wittgenstein
Susan Wolf


Michael Arbib
Walter Baade
Bernard Baars
Gregory Bateson
John S. Bell
Charles Bennett
Ludwig von Bertalanffy
Susan Blackmore
Margaret Boden
David Bohm
Niels Bohr
Ludwig Boltzmann
Emile Borel
Max Born
Satyendra Nath Bose
Walther Bothe
Hans Briegel
Leon Brillouin
Stephen Brush
Henry Thomas Buckle
S. H. Burbury
Donald Campbell
Anthony Cashmore
Eric Chaisson
Jean-Pierre Changeux
Arthur Holly Compton
John Conway
John Cramer
E. P. Culverwell
Charles Darwin
Richard Dawkins
Terrence Deacon
Lüder Deecke
Louis de Broglie
Max Delbrück
Abraham de Moivre
Paul Dirac
Hans Driesch
John Eccles
Arthur Stanley Eddington
Gerald Edelman
Paul Ehrenfest
Albert Einstein
Hugh Everett, III
Franz Exner
Richard Feynman
R. A. Fisher
Joseph Fourier
Philipp Frank
Lila Gatlin
Michael Gazzaniga
GianCarlo Ghirardi
J. Willard Gibbs
Nicolas Gisin
Paul Glimcher
Thomas Gold
Brian Goodwin
Joshua Greene
Jacques Hadamard
Patrick Haggard
Stuart Hameroff
Augustin Hamon
Sam Harris
Hyman Hartman
John-Dylan Haynes
Donald Hebb
Martin Heisenberg
Werner Heisenberg
John Herschel
Art Hobson
Jesper Hoffmeyer
E. T. Jaynes
William Stanley Jevons
Roman Jakobson
Pascual Jordan
Ruth E. Kastner
Stuart Kauffman
Martin J. Klein
Simon Kochen
Hans Kornhuber
Stephen Kosslyn
Ladislav Kovàč
Rolf Landauer
Alfred Landé
Pierre-Simon Laplace
David Layzer
Benjamin Libet
Seth Lloyd
Hendrik Lorentz
Josef Loschmidt
Ernst Mach
Donald MacKay
Henry Margenau
James Clerk Maxwell
Ernst Mayr
John McCarthy
Ulrich Mohrhoff
Jacques Monod
Emmy Noether
Abraham Pais
Howard Pattee
Wolfgang Pauli
Massimo Pauri
Roger Penrose
Steven Pinker
Colin Pittendrigh
Max Planck
Susan Pockett
Henri Poincaré
Daniel Pollen
Ilya Prigogine
Hans Primas
Adolphe Quételet
Juan Roederer
Jerome Rothstein
David Ruelle
Erwin Schrödinger
Aaron Schurger
Claude Shannon
David Shiang
Herbert Simon
Dean Keith Simonton
B. F. Skinner
Roger Sperry
John Stachel
Henry Stapp
Tom Stonier
Antoine Suarez
Leo Szilard
Max Tegmark
William Thomson (Kelvin)
Giulio Tononi
Peter Tse
Vlatko Vedral
Heinz von Foerster
John von Neumann
John B. Watson
Daniel Wegner
Steven Weinberg
Paul A. Weiss
John Wheeler
Wilhelm Wien
Norbert Wiener
Eugene Wigner
E. O. Wilson
H. Dieter Zeh
Ernst Zermelo
Wojciech Zurek
Konrad Zuse
Fritz Zwicky


Free Will
Mental Causation
James Symposium
Hans Primas

Hans Primas is a professor emeritus of chemistry at ETH in Zurich, with strong interests in psychology and philosophy inspired by the work of C. G. Jung and Wolfgang Pauli and their collaborations. Primas' scientific work is in nuclear magnetic resonance (his student and colleague Richard R. Ernst won the Nobel Prize for Chemistry in 1991 for work on NMR), on formulations of quantum mechanics, on the problem of measurement, and on realism in quantum theory.

Information is a neutral enabler of experience (perceptions) that faces both the material world (objects) and the immaterial mind
(a subject with concepts)
With Harald Atmanspacher, Primas edited the 2009 book Recasting Reality, papers delivered at a conference on Wolfgang Pauli's Philosophical Ideas and Contemporary Science. The conference goals included the idea of a psychophysically neutral monism with mind and matter as dual aspects, which Pauli favored. This dual-aspect monism represents a seriously discussed alternative to reductionist or materialist accounts in current discussions in the philosophy of mind and psychology.

Primas' 2009 article, "Complementary of Mind and Matter," is an exegesis of what may have been Pauli's thoughts on psyche and physis - mind and matter.

1 Introduction: Pauli on Mind and Matter

At the end of his authoritative article The Influence of Archetypal Ideas on the Scientific Theories of Kepler Wolfgang Pauli (1952, p. 164) stated:

He continued with the visionary remark:
1. How can we characterize "physis"?
2. How can we characterize "psyche"?
3. What do we mean by "complementarity aspects"?
4. What do we mean by "the same reality"?

These questions are not yet well-defined - there are many possible answers. In the following I propose a scenario in which Pauli's vision can be discussed consistently in simple and mathematically well-defined terms which allow us to work out additional details. Thereby I adopt an ontological monism, combined with an epistemic symmetry breaking leading to an epistemic dual-aspect approach. The dual aspects refer to tenseless descriptions in terms of a homogeneous time and to tensed descriptions in terms of a non-homogeneous time characterized by a privileged instant, the Now.

2 The First Problem: What is Matter?

2.1 Pauli's Answer

Even the answer to the apparently easy question "what is matter?" has changed dramatically several times since 1644, when Descartes classified matter and mind as distinct substances. At any rate, the traditional characterization of the physical as res extensa and of the mental as res cogitans does not allow to construct a workable theory for the mind-matter problem.

Similarly we cannot adopt atomism, which was the starting point of historical classical science: the idea that there exist theory-independent elementary objects, for example in the sense of Newton:

"God in the Beginning form'd Matter in solid,
massy, hard, impenetrable moveable Particles".

Today nobody defends Newton's atomistic ontology any more. Nevertheless, the naive reductionism which tries to explain all phenomena in terms of entities at a supposedly lowest level of theoretical description is still popular. This approach fails simply because the presumed lower level entities do not exist in a theory-independent sense.

We replace the vague "patterns of reality" with the more concrete "information structures"
Modern quantum mechanics put an end to atomism. The so-called "fundamental" entities (such as electrons, quarks, or gluons) represent patterns of reality, yet they are not building blocks of reality. They are not primary, but rather secondary and derived, in the same sense as solitons are localized excitations of water, and not building blocks of water.

There is a bewildering diversity of concepts of matter. Certainly no substantial advance in the mind-matter problem can be achieved without a clear characterization of what we mean by matter. Fortunately we can find a modern answer to the question What is Matter? in Pauli's (1954) contribution to the International Symposium Presented in Honor of the Two-Hundredth Anniversary of Columbia University:

"Matter has always been and will always be one of the main objects of physics. . . . even light has become matter now, due to Einstein's discoveries. It has mass and also weight; it is not different from ordinary matter, it too having both energy and momentum."
"Taking the existence of all these transmutations into account, what remains of the old ideas of matter and substance? The answer is energy. This is the true substance, that which is conserved; only the form in which it appears is changing."

2.2 Matter and Homogeneous Time

Adopting Pauli's answer, we have to recall that energy conservation is subject to a fundamental theorem by Emmy Noether (1918) which provides a deep connection between symmetries and conservation laws: For every conservation law, there exists a continuous symmetry. By definition, energy is the conserved quantity related to the time-translation symmetry. The concept of energy is meaningless if time is not homogeneous. In other words, energy conservation holds only if the presupposed equations of motion do not contain any preferred moment of time.

3 The Second Problem:
How to Characterize the Mental Domain?

3.1 Violation of Physical Laws?

A recurrent theme in discussions of the mind-matter problem is the alleged violation of physical laws - usually without giving a precise account how we have to understand a "physical law". Yet, the scope of validity of conservation laws is well understood: a conservation law holds if and only if the system considered is invariant under the corresponding Noether-symmetry operation. Therefore it makes no sense to argue as Bunge (1980, p. 17) does:

"If immaterial mind could move matter, then it would create energy; and if matter were to act on immaterial mind, then energy would disappear. In either case energy . . . would fail to be conserved. And so physics, chemistry, biology, and economics would collapse."
Intentional influences are not invariant under time-translations, so that in this case any argument involving energy conservation is misplaced. Whenever energy is well-defined, it is conserved by definition. Therefore it makes no sense to speak of the violation of energy conservation.

3.2 The Physical World is Not Causally Closed

Physicalism as a doctrine about the empirical world, claiming "that mental entities, properties, relations and facts are all really physical". Or in another formulation: "Physics can, in principle, predict the probability with which a human body will follow any given trajectory" (Putnam, 1992, p. 83). Many philosophers assume a metaphysical naturalism, claiming that the realm of the physical is "causally closed". In the weakest conception, causal closure means that "every physical phenomenon that has a sufficient cause has a sufficient physical cause". According to Kim (1980, p. 40) another way of stating the principle of physical causal closure is this:

"If you pick any physical event and trace out its causal ancestry or posterity, that will never take you outside the physical domain. . . . If you reject this principle, you are ipso facto rejecting the in-principle completability of physics."

This argument is incorrect for the simple reason of quantum indeterminacy. The determinism of relativity is irrelevant.
This argument is not correct. It is true that under very general conditions any causally open physical system can be embedded into a causally closed time-invariant description with a larger state space. However, such an ad hoc extension presupposes a two-way determinism, where the present is "mathematically determined jointly by the past and future, however remote". That is, only if the external influences are given for all past and future times, then we can reconstruct a local time-invariant deterministic description. Even if we can reconstruct a causal ancestry (which is by no means unique) in every particular case, this does not imply the possibility of a global causal reconstruction.

The assertion that "modern science is premised on the assumption that the material world is a causally closed system" is in striking contradiction to experimental science. Every experiment requires an irreversible dynamics. No experiment refers to a closed physical system. In a strictly deterministic world it would neither be possible to perform meaningful experiments nor to verify the partially causal behavior of a physical system. We conclude that science neither assumes that the material world is a causally closed system, nor that physical laws imply the causal closure of physics.

3.3 Experimental Physics Requires Intentionality

All experimental science is based on the understanding that the actions of an experimenter are intentional, and not actions which happen to him. There are no physical laws which cover intentionality (understood as the mind's directedness upon objects).

Free choice as to which experiment to do is defended even by determinists like Einstein, who saw physical theories as the "free creations of the human mind."
Experimental physics demands the distinction of past and future, the concept of the now, and the freedom of the experimenter to choose initial conditions. To test experimentally whether a given physical system is causal, it is indispensable that the experimenter has the freedom to deliberately choose (within well-defined limits) a stimulus and then to record the response. Moreover, it is required that an experiment can be repeated at any particular instant.

Sometimes it is claimed that such a freedom is illusory. Yet, without this freedom all experimental science would be pointless:

To deny the freedom of action of an experimenter
is to deny the meaningfulness of experimental science.
Every experimental investigation presupposes that the specific design and implementation of an experiment is compatible with, but not exclusively determined by, known physical laws. This situation does not imply that the first principles of physics are inconsistent or not valid, but only that they cannot account for intentionally chosen experimental arrangements and initial conditions. This fact "proves that contingency is an essential feature of the world".

Primas' description of Jung's three domains suggests they are fundamentally informational, thus we can argue for a triple-aspect monism.
5 The Fourth Problem:
How to Characterize the "Unus Mundus"?

5.1 A Model of a Holistic Universe of Discourse.

For convenience but without loss of generality we divide the universe into three mutually compatible parts recognized as a mental domain, a material domain, and an interface between these domains.

For Teachers
For Scholars
Hans Primas' interests have covered an enormous range: methods and instruments for nuclear magnetic resonance, theoretical chemistry, C- and W-algebraic formulations of quantum mechanics, the measurement problem and its various implications, holism and realism in quantum theory, theory reduction, the work and personality of Wolfgang Pauli, as well as Jungian psychology. In many of these elds he provided important and original food for thought, in some cases going far beyond the everyday business in the scientific world. As is the case with other scientists who are conceptually innovative, Hans Primas is read more than he is quoted. His influence is due to his writings. Even with the current flood of publications, he still performs the miracle of having scientists eagerly awaiting his next publication.

His external life, by way of contrast, is not very spectacular. With the exception of a brief period as a guest professor at Washington University at St. Louis, he has never been away from Zurich for any length of time. He has never been awarded any prizes, never organized a congress, never done any organizational work in a scientifi c society. He deliberately distanced himself from the hustle and bustle of national and international scienti fic business.

Hans Primas' professional career started in 1945 with an apprenticeship as a chemical laboratory assistant for an industrial company in Oerlikon, close to his home city of Zurich. In 1948 he began to study chemistry at the Technikum in Winterthur. In 1953 he became a research chemist at the Laboratory for Organic Chemistry, which was headed at the time by the Nobel laureate Leopold Ruzicka. In addition to taking courses in mathematics, he also attended lectures by Wolfgang Pauli during this period.

Under the aegis of Hans-Heinrich Gunthard, Primas became one of the founding members of the Laboratory for Physical Chemistry at the ETH in Zurich, where he stayed until his retirement. In 1960 he received his habilitation in the Chemistry Department and became an associate professor for Physical Chemistry one year later. 1966 saw him appointed as full professor for theoretical chemistry. He was Dean of the Chemistry Department for the periods 1967-68 and 1976-78. In 1991 his former doctoral student and co-worker Richard R. Ernst was awarded the Nobel Prize in Chemistry for his work on nuclear magnetic resonance.

The present volume takes up some of the discussions Primas has initiated or inspired. It deals with fundamental problems in the theory of matter and related philosophical questions. The individual articles have not been professionally reviewed and any editing has been restricted to matters of form. As a special feature of this book, and as a special service for the reader, each contribution is preceded by a brief introduction ("contextual background"), written by the editors, which places it in its scientifi c context in general or in the context of Primas' work in particular. The first three articles are an exception in this respect; to some extent they can be understood as background material themselves. In addition to the subjects they address, they also show aspects of Hans Primas' stature as a scientist. The main body of the volume is organized according to the keywords "matter" and "mind", the first category focusing on physically oriented topics and the second on those of a philosophical nature. At the end of the volume, the reader will fi nd a list of publications by Hans Primas until 1998, the addresses of all contributors, and an index.

After his retirement in 1995, the life of Hans Primas keeps being dedicated to scientifi c and general cultural matters. His workload is still enormous. And he is still no friend of pomp and circumstance - in fact he strongly dislikes such ceremonies. What he does like - and above all respect - is competent and constructive criticism. Habent sua fata libelli: this book is intended to provide valuable ideas and give rise to perceptive criticism or innovative research projects. This is the spirit from which it emerged, and this is the purpose to which it is dedicated.

October 1998
Anton Amann Freiburg/Garching
Harald Atmanspacher Zurich
Ulrich Muller-Herold

Chapter 1.5 - The Philosophers Chapter 2.1 - The Problem of Knowledge
Home Part Two - Knowledge
Normal | Teacher | Scholar