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Core Concepts

Adequate Determinism
Agent-Causality
Alternative Possibilities
Causa Sui
Causality
Certainty
Chance
Chance Not Direct Cause
The Cogito Model
Compatibilism
Conceptual Analysis
Control
Could Do Otherwise
Creativity
De-liberation
Determination
Determination Fallacy
Determinism
Disambiguation
Either Way
Ethical Fallacy
Extreme Libertarianism
Event Has Many Causes
Free Choice
Freedom of Action
"Free Will"
Free Will in Antiquity
Free Will Mechanisms
Free Will Requirements
Free Will Theorem
Future Contingency
Hard Incompatibilism
Illusion of Determinism
Illusionism
Impossibilism
Incompatibilism
Indeterminacy
Indeterminism
Infinities
Libertarianism
Liberty of Indifference
Luck
Modest Libertarianism
Moral Responsibility
Moral Sentiments
Mysteries
Naturalism
Necessity
Noise
Non-Causality
Pre-determinism
Predictability
Probability
Pseudo-Problem
Random When?/Where?
Rational Fallacy
Responsibility
Same Circumstances
Science Advance Fallacy
Second Thoughts
Semicompatibilism
Soft Causality
Standard Argument
Temporal Sequence
Tertium Quid
Torn Decision
Two-Stage Models
Ultimate Responsibility
Uncertainty
Up To Us

Philosophers

Mortimer Adler
Rogers Albritton
Alexander of Aphrodisias
G.E.M.Anscombe
Thomas Aquinas
Aristotle
David Armstrong
Augustine
A.J.Ayer
Mark Balaguer
William Belsham
Henri Bergson
Isaiah Berlin
Bernard Berofsky
Susanne Bobzien
George Boole
Émile Boutroux
F.H.Bradley
C.D.Broad
C.A.Campbell
Joseph Keim Campbell
Carneades
Ernst Cassirer
Roderick Chisholm
Chrysippus
Cicero
Randolph Clarke
Donald Davidson
Democritus
Daniel Dennett
René Descartes
Richard Double
Fred Dretske
John Earman
Laura Waddell Ekstrom
Epictetus
Epicurus
John Martin Fischer
Owen Flanagan
Philippa Foot
Alfred Fouillée
Harry Frankfurt
Richard L. Franklin
Carl Ginet
Nicholas St. John Green
Ian Hacking
Ishtiyaque Haji
Stuart Hampshire
Georg W.F. Hegel
Martin Heidegger
R.E.Hobart
Thomas Hobbes
David Hodgson
Shadsworth Hodgson
Ted Honderich
Pamela Huby
David Hume
William James
Robert Kane
Immanuel Kant
Tomis Kapitan
Christine Korsgaard
Keith Lehrer
Gottfried Leibniz
Leucippus
C.I.Lewis
David Lewis
Peter Lipton
John Locke
John R. Lucas
Lucretius
Hugh McCann
Colin McGinn
Michael McKenna
Alfred Mele
John Stuart Mill
Dickinson Miller
G.E.Moore
Thomas Nagel
Friedrich Nietzsche
P.H.Nowell-Smith
Robert Nozick
William of Ockham
Timothy O'Connor
Charles Sanders Peirce
Derk Pereboom
Steven Pinker
Karl Popper
H.A.Prichard
Hilary Putnam
Willard van Orman Quine
Frank Ramsey
Ayn Rand
Thomas Reid
Charles Renouvier
Nicholas Rescher
C.W.Rietdijk
Josiah Royce
Bertrand Russell
Paul Russell
Gilbert Ryle
T.M.Scanlon
Moritz Schlick
Arthur Schopenhauer
John Searle
Henry Sidgwick
Walter Sinnott-Armstrong
J.J.C.Smart
Saul Smilansky
Michael Smith
L. Susan Stebbing
Galen Strawson
Peter Strawson
Eleonore Stump
Richard Taylor
Kevin Timpe
Peter van Inwagen
Manuel Vargas
John Venn
Kadri Vihvelin
Voltaire
G.H. von Wright
R. Jay Wallace
Ted Warfield
Roy Weatherford
Alfred North Whitehead
David Widerker
David Wiggins
Ludwig Wittgenstein
Susan Wolf

Scientists

Michael Arbib
Bernard Baars
John S. Bell
Charles Bennett
Margaret Boden
David Bohm
Neils Bohr
Ludwig Boltzmann
Max Born
Stephen Brush
Leon Brillouin
Thomas Buckle
Anthony Cashmore
Arthur Holly Compton
Abraham de Moivre
Paul Dirac
John Eccles
Arthur Stanley Eddington
Albert Einstein
Richard Feynman
GianCarlo Ghirardi
Nicolas Gisin
A.O.Gomes
Joshua Greene
Jacques Hadamard
Martin Heisenberg
Werner Heisenberg
Pascual Jordan
Simon Kochen
Stephen Kosslyn
Rolf Landauer
Alfred Landé
Pierre-Simon Laplace
David Layzer
Benjamin Libet
Josef Loschmidt
Ernst Mach
Henry Margenau
James Clerk Maxwell
Ernst Mayr
Jacques Monod
Roger Penrose
Steven Pinker
Max Planck
Henri Poincaré
Adolphe Quételet
Jerome Rothstein
Erwin Schrödinger
Claude Shannon
Herbert Simon
B. F. Skinner
Antoine Suarez
Leo Szilard
William Thomson (Kelvin)
John von Neumann
Daniel Wegner
Steven Weinberg
Norbert Wiener
Eugene Wigner
E. O. Wilson
Ernst Zermelo

 
Responsibility Either Way
Robert Kane developed the idea of dual rational control in the case of a "torn decision."

In a torn decision, an agent has equally powerful reasons for choosing either way between two alternatives. Kane says the agent can choose either way at random and yet preserve the sense of moral responsibility. As long as the agent is prepared to accept responsibility either way, flipping a coin does no harm to moral responsibility.

Dual rational control means the agent can go either way, which means to "do otherwise" in exactly the same circumstances. Either way the agent is making a rational decision, and Kane claims the agent is in control of the decision. Some critics deny this is real control if the decision is random.

Kane distinguishes such choices from the ancient liberty of indifference (liberum arbitrium indifferentiae) in which there is no meaningful difference between the choices, such as the classic idea of Buridan's Ass.

The Scholastic Jean Buridan imagined an ass placed equidistant between two identical bales of hay. Buridan used it to show a critical difference between man and animals.

Most Scholastics claimed the ass would starve to death (which is nonsense), but a human in similar circumstances, with a god-given gift of free will, in this case the liberty of indifference, would deliberate and choose despite the perfect balance between identical alternatives.

By contrast, Kane's "torn decisions" are often between a moral choice and an expedient choice. These are the kinds of decisions that Aristotle thought of as character building and Kane calls "Self-Forming Actions" or SFAs.

Kane considers the case of a businesswoman on the way to an important meeting when she observes an assault in an alley. She has excellent (moral and humanitarian) reasons to help the victim. She has equally important (practical and self-interested) reasons to continue on and advance her career.

Kane argues that whichever way the businesswoman decides, and even if the torn decision is undetermined as a result of neural noise, she has excellent reasons to take responsibility either way.

Note that in a two-stage model of free will, the businesswoman might generate more alternatives before her decision. Before she decides (randomly) between the given choices, she may come up with additional alternative possibilities. She might for example continue on to her meeting but get out her cell phone to report the crime and call for assistance. On her way she might tell any passersby to go to the victim’s aid. Note that these creative new options can “come to her” up to and even beyond the moment of choice in this case (while she is on her way to the office).

For Teachers
References:
For Scholars

Chapter 3.7 - The Ergod Chapter 4.2 - The History of Free Will
Part Three - Value Part Five - Problems
Normal | Teacher | Scholar